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Preliminary Safety Evaluation of the Advanced Burner Test Reactor 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Results of a preliminary safety evaluation of the Advanced Burner Test Reactor 
(ABTR) pre-conceptual design are reported.  The ABTR safety design approach is 
described.  Traditional defense-in-depth design features are supplemented with 
passive safety performance characteristics that include natural circulation 
emergency decay heat removal and reactor power reduction by inherent reactivity 
feedbacks in accidents.  ABTR safety performance in design-basis and beyond-
design-basis accident sequences is estimated based on analyses.  Modeling 
assumptions and input data for safety analyses are presented.  Analysis results for 
simulation of simultaneous loss of coolant pumping power and normal heat 
rejection are presented and discussed, both for the case with reactor scram and the 
case without reactor scram.  The analysis results indicate that the ABTR pre-
conceptual design is capable of undergoing bounding design-basis and beyond-
design-basis accidents without fuel cladding failures.  The first line of defense for 
protection of the public against release of radioactivity in accidents remains intact 
with significant margin.  A comparison and evaluation of general safety design 
criteria for the ABTR conceptual design phase are presented in an appendix.  A 
second appendix presents SASSYS-1 computer code capabilities and modeling 
enhancements implemented for ABTR analyses.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A pre-conceptual design for an Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) is being developed by 
the U.S Department of Energy under the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) and the Global 
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).  Within GNEP, it is envisioned that fast spectrum 
Advanced Burner Reactors (ABRs) will be employed to consume transuranics and produce 
power.  The goals for the ABTR are to prove the concept of effectively burning transuranics for 
waste management, to support development and qualification of fuels and materials for the ABR 
standard design, to test safety design features, and to support ABR design certification.   
 
This report provides a preliminary safety evaluation for the pre-conceptual ABTR design [1].  
The current ABTR design concept specifies a 250 MWt liquid sodium-cooled fast reactor in a 
pool-type primary system configuration.  The ABTR fuel is a metallic alloy of uranium, 
zirconium, plutonium, and higher actinides clad with low-swelling stainless steel.  The emphasis 
in this report is to provide an estimate of the performance of the design in bounding design-basis 
and beyond-design-basis accident sequences.  For the design-basis sequence, the analysis focuses 
on natural circulation decay heat removal capability.  For the beyond-design-basis sequence, the 
analysis examines both inherent reactivity shutdown performance and decay heat removal. 
 
The following sections provide an introductory discussion of the ABTR reactor safety design 
approach, natural circulation heat removal, and inherent reactivity feedback characteristics. 
 
1.1 Safety Design Approach 
 
The safety goals in nuclear power reactor design and operation are to assure the health and safety 
of the public, to protect the plant operating staff from harm, and to prevent plant damage.  
Traditionally, these goals have been fulfilled by an approach that 1) minimizes risk by 
maximizing safety margins, 2) reduces the likelihood of potentially harmful events, and 3) 
provides additional design features to mitigate the harmful consequences of low probability 
events.  This approach is usually identified as “defense in depth.” 
 
The basic principle of “defense in depth” is to provide multiple levels of protection.  The 
protective levels may be physical barriers, like the multiple barriers to release of radioactivity 
provided by the fuel cladding, the primary coolant system, and the reactor containment building.  
Alternatively, the multiple layers may be provided by active systems, like the reactor shutdown 
systems and the reactor cooling systems.  In some instances, components of the “defense in 
depth” strategy may consist of procedures and practices, such as emergency planning.  However, 
in all instances, the “defense in depth” strategy depends on the independence of the protective 
measures, so that no single event can breech more than one protective level. 
 
The ABTR safety design approach implements the “defense in depth” strategy by adopting the 
traditional three levels of safety.  In addition, the ABTR design features have been selected to 
provide significant safety margin enhancements by inherent, passive safety responses to upset 
conditions and equipment failures.   
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At the first level, the ABTR is designed to operate with a high level of reliability, so that accident 
initiators are prevented from occurring.  The first level of safety is assured in part by selection of 
fuel, cladding, coolant, and structural materials that are stable and compatible, and provide large 
margins between normal operating conditions and limiting failure conditions.  Next, the first 
level of safety is assured by adopting an arrangement of components that allows continuous or 
periodic monitoring, inspection, and testing for performance changes or degradation.  Finally, the 
ABTR design provides for repair and replacement of components necessary to assure the first 
level of safety. 
 
For the ABTR pre-conceptual design, the selection of liquid sodium coolant and metallic fuel 
with a pool-type primary system arrangement for the reference configuration provides a highly 
reliable reactor system with large operational safety margins.  Liquid sodium thermo-physical 
properties provide superior heat transport and removal characteristics and a large temperature 
margin to boiling at low operating pressure.  Metallic fuel operates at relative low temperature, 
below the coolant boiling point, due to its high thermal conductivity.  The pool-type primary 
system confines all significantly radioactive materials within a single vessel, and promotes easy 
removal and replacement of components as well as shutdown heat removal under natural 
circulation. 
 
At the second level of safety, the ABTR is designed to provide protection in the event of an 
equipment failure or an operating error.  This level of protection is provided by engineered safety 
systems for reactor shutdown, reactor heat removal, and emergency power.  Each of these safety-
grade back-up systems functions in the event of failure in the corresponding operating system, 
and are subjected to continuous monitoring and periodic testing and inspection. 
 
The ABTR design provides a secondary reactor shutdown system that is independently powered 
and instrumented, and which operates automatically to reduce reactor power rapidly in the event 
that the primary shutdown system fails.  For shutdown cooling, the ABTR design contains a 
safety-grade emergency heat removal system, independent from the normal heat removal system, 
which is capable of removing residual decay heat by natural circulation.  In addition to the 
normal off-site power supply, the ABTR is equipped with a second independent off-site power 
connection.  The two off-site power connections are supplemented with a safety-grade on-site 
emergency power supply. 
 
The third level of safety provides additional protection of the public health and safety in an 
extremely unlikely event that is not expected to occur in the life of the plant, or which was not 
foreseen at the time the plant was designed and constructed. 
 
In the ABTR design, level 3 protection for cooling assurance and containment of radioactivity 
are provided by the reactor guard vessel and the reactor containment building.  The reactor guard 
vessel is designed to hold primary coolant in the extremely unlikely event of a leak in the 
primary coolant system.  The reactor guard vessel assures that the reactor core remains covered 
with sodium and cooled by the emergency heat removal system, even if the primary reactor 
vessel fails.  In the extremely unlikely event that primary coolant leaks and oxidizes in the 
reactor building air atmosphere, or if cladding failures release gaseous fission products, the 
reactor containment building provides a low-leakage barrier to release of radioactivity. 
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The three levels of safety together encompass the safety design basis for ABTR.  For the 
purposes of subsequent safety design development, qualification, and documentation, it is 
customary during the conceptual design phase to identify general design criteria that collectively 
serve as a safety basis for design assessment.  A preliminary cross reference and evaluation of 
existing general design criteria from 10CFR50 Appendix A, from ANSI/ANS Standard 54.1, and 
from DOE Order 5480.30 are included in Appendix A of this report.   
 
The normal safety design envelope considers design basis accidents (DBAs) that assume single 
failures.  By definition, accidents within the design basis, usually taken to have a frequency of 
occurrence of once in a million reactor years or more, must be accommodated by the design and 
shown to present risks to the public that are within regulatory standards.  Beyond the design 
basis, there exists a class of accidents of such low probability that they are termed 
“hypothetical.”  These events involve multiple failures of safety grade systems, and have a 
frequency less than 10-6 per reactor year.  Because of the potentially severe consequences of 
accidents in this class, they have received significant regulatory scrutiny in prior sodium-cooled 
fast reactor licensing reviews for the purpose of characterizing thermal and structural safety 
margins beyond the design basis. 
 
Three beyond-design-basis accident (BDBA) sequences, each involving failure of both reactor 
scram systems, have received attention in past licensing safety assessments.  In the unprotected 
loss-of-flow (ULOF) sequence, it is assumed that all primary and secondary coolant pumps cease 
operation, and the reactor scram systems fail to activate.  In the unprotected transient overpower 
(UTOP) sequence, it is assumed that one or more inserted control rods are withdrawn, and the 
reactor scram systems fail to operate.  In the unprotected loss-of-heat-sink (LOHS) accident, it is 
assumed that heat removal through the power conversion system is lost, and the reactor scram 
systems do not activate.  Taken collectively, these three accident initiators encompass all the 
ways that an operating reactor can be perturbed, i.e. by a change in coolant flow, by a change in 
reactivity, or by a change in coolant inlet temperature.  
 
The proposed ABTR design is capable of accommodating beyond design basis accident initiators 
without producing high temperatures leading to severe accident conditions such as coolant 
boiling, cladding failures, or fuel melting.  The inherent neutronic, hydraulic, and thermal 
performance characteristics of the ABTR design provide self-protection in beyond-design-basis 
sequences to limit accident consequences without activation of engineered systems or operator 
actions.  This characteristic has been termed “passive safety”, and has been demonstrated in full-
scale tests for the ULOF and ULOHS sequences in Experimental Breeder Reactor-II [2].  
Analyses have shown that the passive safety characteristic of the ABTR design is inherent to any 
design with sodium coolant, metallic fuel, and a pool-type primary system arrangement. 
 
Within the overall safety framework for ABTR, passive safety serves to provide additional 
margins for public protection in the event of very low probability accidents whose frequency of 
occurrence is lower than the normal threshold for deterministic assessment.  The ABTR passive 
safety performance characteristic assures that no abnormal radioactivity releases will occur in the 
event of beyond-design-basis accidents, and that all of the multiple defense-in-depth barriers 
(fuel cladding, reactor vessel, containment building) for public protection will remain intact, just 
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as for design basis accidents.  The passive safety performance of ABTR eliminates the potential 
for severe accident consequences in very low frequency, beyond-design-basis sequences.  
Consequently, for ABTR, beyond-design-basis accidents need to be considered only in the 
context of probabilistic risk assessments, and not as the subject of deterministic analysis 
documented in the safety analysis reports (SARs). 
 
1.2 Natural Circulation Heat Removal 
 
The ABTR primary system design is configured to provide natural circulation shutdown heat 
removal.  The capability to remove shutdown decay heat with natural circulation provides a 
means to maintain reactor component temperatures at acceptable levels even in the event of loss 
of all off-site and emergency on-site power supplies.  This section presents a discussion of the 
design features that contribute to this capability.  A quantitative assessment of ABTR emergency 
decay heat removal by natural circulation in a protected (i.e. with scram) loss of flow accident 
sequence is provided in Section 2.4. 
 
Natural circulation flow arises due to the effect of gravity on a continuous fluid with a density 
difference along the elevation.  Heavy fluid sinks to displace lighter fluid.  Buoyancy-induced 
flow can be established when a fluid is heated, decreasing its density, at an axial position below 
the elevation at which the fluid is cooled, increasing its density.  In a one-dimensional model, 
flow occurs when the buoyancy force is great enough to overcome form, friction, and shear 
losses.  The natural circulation flow rate is regulated by the balance between the buoyancy force 
and the flow-related pressure losses. When the buoyancy force is provided by a thermally-driven 
density difference, the fluid flow rate will be determined by the fluid properties, the elevation 
difference between the heat sink and the heat source, and the temperature difference in the fluid 
between the heat source and the heat sink. 
 
Liquid sodium and its alloys are excellent fluids for natural circulation heat removal because of 
their thermo-physical properties.  Due primarily to its high thermal conductivity, liquid sodium is 
capable of very high convective heat transfer rates, even at the modest fluid velocities 
characteristic of natural circulation.  This tends to minimize the temperature differences between 
the heat source and the fluid, and between the fluid and the heat sink, and to reduce the overall 
source-to-sink temperature difference required for natural circulation cooling. 
 
The ABTR design is configured to promote natural circulation shutdown heat removal.  The key 
design parameters are 1) provision for a relatively free-flowing fluid natural circulation path, and 
2) provision for sufficient elevation difference between the heat source and the heat sink.  In the 
ABTR emergency shutdown heat removal design, each of the direct reactor auxiliary cooling 
systems (DRACS) consists of two natural circulation loops joined by a heat exchanger.  Acting 
together, these loops remove heat from the reactor to the ultimate heat sink, atmospheric air, by 
way of a second heat exchanger.  The natural circulation path is maintained even in the 
hypothetical case of a leak in the reactor vessel. 
 
In the primary coolant circuit, natural circulation flow for shutdown heat removal is established 
along the same flow path used for normal operation.  Coolant is heated in the reactor, rises to the 
hot pool, and flows through the intermediate heat exchangers (IHX) to the cold pool.  In 
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accidents or emergency shutdown conditions in which no heat is removed from the coolant in the 
IHXs, heat is removed by multiple DRACS heat exchangers mounted high in the cold pool.  
Primary coolant chilled in the DRACS heat exchangers falls to near the bottom of the cold pool, 
where it travels into the primary coolant pump inlet and back to the reactor.  This completes the 
primary coolant natural circulation circuit with heat added in the reactor and removed at the 
DRACS heat exchangers.  
 
Heat removed from the cold pool at a DRACS heat exchanger is transferred to a second natural 
circulation loop.  In ABTR, the working fluid in this second loop is sodium-potassium alloy 
(NaK).  The NaK loop carries the heat through piping to a second heat exchanger located at a 
high elevation outside the containment building, where the heat is rejected to environmental air.  
The relatively low melting point of NaK minimizes the potential for freezing in the secondary 
loop. 
 
The ABTR DRACS circuits are designed to operate at reduced flow during power operation, to 
minimize parasitic heat losses.  However, maintaining some flow at all times avoids the high 
transient DRACS start-up temperatures that would occur upon natural circulation initiation from 
stagnant conditions.  
 
1.3 Inherent Feedback Characteristics 
 
As noted in the prior section, the design of ABTR provides for natural circulation decay heat 
removal, so that in the event of failures in all active cooling systems, shutdown heat removal is 
assured.  In order to complete the passive safety envelope, it is necessary to provide sufficient 
negative reactivity to extinguish reactor fission power and bring the reactor to decay heat power 
level.  As long as one of the two active safety-grade reactor scram systems operate, reactor 
fission power will be rapidly terminated.  However, in the extremely unlikely event that both of 
the reactor scram systems fail, the ABTR inherent reactivity feedback characteristics will act to 
reduce fission power, and eventually to equilibrate reactor power with the available heat sink. 
 
In the ABTR pre-conceptual design, inherent reactivity feedback characteristics are present due 
to the reactor physics performance characteristics of the reactor and the thermal, hydraulic, and 
mechanical design features.  The selection of reactor materials and their configuration provides 
inherent reactivity feedback effects that act to compensate for accidental perturbations to normal 
reactor operation, such as equipment failures or operator errors leading to reactivity addition, 
loss of coolant flow, or loss of heat removal.  The inherent reactivity feedback characteristics are 
triggered by changes in fuel, cladding, coolant, or structural temperatures that cause negative 
reactivity feedback either directly, such as the fuel Doppler resonance reactivity due to an 
elevation in temperature (power increase), or indirectly, such as radial core thermal expansion 
associated with heating of the core structural elements (coolant temperature increase) or axial 
thermal expansion of the fuel pins (fuel and cladding temperature increase).  Because the 
inherent reactivity feedback characteristics do not depend on operator action or activation of an 
engineered component, such as a valve or pump, the inherent feedbacks contribute to ABTR 
passive safety performance.  
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The very favorable passive safety characteristic of the ABTR design is a direct result of the 
selection of metallic fuel.  To understand the physical basis for this situation, recall that it is 
necessary to supply positive reactivity to raise the reactor power and temperature to operating 
conditions, normally by withdrawal of a neutron absorber.  Positive reactivity is needed to 
overcome the negative Doppler reactivity coming from the fuel temperature increase.  However, 
because metallic fuel has a high thermal conductivity, the operating temperature of metallic fuel 
is relatively low, and consequently a relatively small amount of positive reactivity is needed to 
bring the ABTR to full power.  To reduce the fission power, it is necessary to supply enough 
negative reactivity to overcome the positive reactivity inserted for power ascension.  With 
metallic fuel, the negative reactivity needed to reduce power is small because the positive 
reactivity inserted to raise the power is small.  In the ABTR design, negative inherent reactivity 
feedbacks are supplied by a number of thermal and mechanical mechanisms that have been 
observed and quantified by testing in EBR-II.  The ABTR design features have been selected to 
assure that these mechanisms will act reliably in accident conditions, and will together supply the 
net negative feedback reactivity needed to limit and reduce reactor fission power. 
 
In ABTR, the mechanisms that supply negative reactivity feedback arise from fuel, coolant, 
and/or core structural temperature changes.  In the unprotected loss-of-flow (ULOF) sequence, 
reduced coolant flow results in an increase in the coolant outlet temperature, and heating of the 
cladding and the above-core structure.  Thermal expansion of the cladding, combined with the 
low strength of irradiated metallic fuel, results in elongation of the core fuel, reduction of the fuel 
density, and negative reactivity feedback.  Thermal expansion of the above-core structure, by 
design, results in radial spreading of the core at the above-core load pad location, and a reduction 
of effective core density, introducing negative reactivity.  These effects counter the positive 
Doppler reactivity associated with chilling of the fuel during the flow coast-down.  In the longer 
term, as the temperature wave propagates to the hot pool, thermal expansion of the control rod 
drivelines acts to insert control material and negative reactivity.  As long as the core outlet 
temperature remains below the threshold for coolant boiling or cladding failures, the net negative 
reactivity will decrease the power to decay heat level, and eventually establish equilibrium 
between the available heat rejection and the reactor power.  This accident sequence, and the 
reactivity mechanisms described, has been demonstrated from full power and flow in EBR-II [2] 
without cladding failures or coolant boiling. 
 
In the unprotected loss-of-heat-sink (ULOHS) sequence, the loss of normal heat rejection results 
in elevation of the core inlet temperature.  Heating and thermal expansion of the core support 
plate spreads the core radially and causes a strongly negative reactivity feedback that quenches 
the reactor fission power.  Other reactivity mechanisms include fuel Doppler, axial expansion 
and contraction, control rod driveline expansion and contraction, and reactor vessel expansion, 
but the core support plate expansion dominates.  While the decay heat is greater than the 
available emergency heat sink, the system temperature will continue to rise, albeit slowly 
because of the large system heat capacity.  When the decay heat falls below the heat removal 
capacity, the entire systems will slowly cool down, and the reactivity balance will establish 
equilibrium between the available heat sink and the reactor power.  This accident sequence, and 
the associated reactivity mechanisms, has been demonstrated from full power and flow initial 
conditions in EBR-II [2] without cladding failures or coolant boiling. 
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Because of the reduced control requirements (reduced cold-to-hot reactivity swing) for metallic 
fuel, the initiating reactivity available by control rod withdrawal for the unprotected transient 
overpower (UTOP) accident sequence is relatively small.  Consequently, the inherent reactivity 
feedbacks are able to limit the power rise during the positive reactivity insertion.  Once the 
insertion is complete, the inherent reactivity feedback mechanisms act to reduce the reactor 
power until balance is achieved between the heat rejection rate through the balance-of-plant and 
the reactor power.  Because the reactivity initiator for metallic fuel is small, the system 
temperature rise needed to establish equilibrium is small, and safety margins to cladding failures 
or coolant boiling are maintained. 
 
The ABTR design relies on design concepts proven in EBR-II testing to supply inherently 
negative reactivity feedback mechanisms that, when combined with the beneficial thermal and 
neutronic characteristics of metallic fuel, yield benign temperature rises for all possible beyond-
design-basis accident initiators.  Sufficient safety margins are maintained to prevent coolant 
boiling, cladding failure, or progression into severe accident conditions.  Natural circulation heat 
removal and inherent reactivity feedback characteristics together provide a safety basis for 
ABTR that surpasses conventional power reactors.  This level of safety performance is attainable 
in a sodium-cooled, metallic fueled, pool-type fast reactor design. 
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2.0 Safety Analyses 
 
Preliminary analyses have been completed to assess the potential safety performance 
characteristics of the Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) pre-conceptual design. The scope 
of the analyses presented here focuses on the ability of ABTR to provide inherent protection 
against damaging consequences in low probability accident sequences involving multiple 
equipment failures. 
 
2.1 Background and Summary 
 
This section provides summary descriptions of the accident sequences analyzed and the results 
obtained.  Detailed descriptions are provided in subsequent sections. 
 
2.1.1 Analysis Background 
 
One of the primary goals in the ABTR design is to provide not only the customary safety 
margins in design basis events, but also to deliver superior safety performance in beyond design 
basis events involving multiple equipment failures or unplanned operator actions. Consequently, 
the preliminary analyses presented here examines the behavior of ABTR in response to an 
accident initiator that is normally considered to have a low occurrence frequency, but potentially 
severe consequences, especially when engineered safety systems are assumed to fail. 
 
The accident initiator examined here is the total loss of normal power to the reactor cooling 
system while the plant is operating at full rated power. Within the plant, the effect of this initiator 
is the loss of normal operation of all reactor coolant pumps. According to design, the plant 
responds with a reactor scram, with activation of emergency power supplies (diesel generators 
and batteries), and with activation of the normal shutdown heat removal mode. The normal 
shutdown heat removal path is through the reactor coolant system and the power cycle heat 
exchanger, with auxiliary power supplied by the emergency power supplies. As a backup, a low-
capacity emergency heat removal system is provided to remove heat directly from the reactor 
without the need for emergency power. 
 
However, in the accident sequence analyzed here, the loss of power is assumed to be 
accompanied by a complete failure of the emergency power supply system, resulting in a total 
loss of power to the reactor and intermediate coolant pumps. It is also assumed that the power 
generation plant immediately ceases operation, and provides no heat rejection capacity. The sole 
heat removal path following the loss of forced coolant flow is through the emergency heat 
removal system by natural circulation. This sequence was analyzed for the case with an 
immediate reactor scram, and for the case without reactor scram. These cases are identified as 
the protected loss-of-flow (PLOF) and the unprotected loss-of-flow (ULOF) cases respectively. 
The PLOF and ULOF accident sequences both assume multiple equipment failures, failures of 
safety grade protection and cooling systems, and no operator actions. These sequences are an 
extreme test of the ABTR to provide inherent self-protection against the consequences of the 
most severe accident initiators. 
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2.1.2 Results Summary 
 
The detailed analysis results for the PLOF and ULOF accident sequences are presented in 
Section 2.4 below. Although both sequences simulate accidents that for some reactor designs 
may cause damage to the fuel and possibly progress into severe accident conditions, in the 
ABTR these events cause no damage. For both accident sequences, reactor fuel, cladding, and 
coolant temperatures remain below safety limits. 
 
In the PLOF sequence, the loss of forced coolant flow and normal heat removal is accompanied 
immediately by a reactor scram, which quickly brings the reactor power to decay heat levels. 
Early in the sequence, the emergency decay heat removal system does not have sufficient 
capacity to remove all the heat being produced, so system temperatures rise. However, due to the 
large heat capacity of the sodium-cooled pool-type concept, the ABTR is able to absorb a 
significant amount of energy with only a slight temperature increase, and the natural circulation 
capability of the ABTR promotes heat removal through the available emergency heat sink. After 
about 5 hours, the reactor decay heat falls to the capacity of the emergency heat removal system, 
and system temperatures begin to decrease. The analysis predicts that short coolant and cladding 
temperature spikes occur during the transition to natural circulation, but no significant fuel 
damage or cladding failures would occur. 
 
In the ULOF accident, the reactor safety system fails to scram the reactor upon loss of forced 
coolant flow and normal heat removal, so the reactor remains at full power initially. Within the 
first minute, reactor temperatures increase as the coolant flow rate decreases, and inherent 
reactivity feedbacks reduce the reactor power. During this time, peak cladding temperatures rise 
to approximately 600°C. As coolant flow continues to decline, a second temperature peak occurs, 
and peak fuel and cladding temperatures reach approximately 660°C. This increase in 
temperature provides the necessary driving force to establish natural circulation flow. The 
development of natural circulation reduces the peak fuel and cladding temperatures back to 
around 600°C, after which temperatures remain stable. 
 
The primary significance of the analysis results for the PLOF and ULOF accident sequences is 
that no significant fuel damage or cladding failures would occur, even when multiple safety 
systems are assumed to malfunction. Time-at-temperature results from the PLOF and ULOF 
analyses indicate a maximum fuel/cladding penetration thickness of 0.001 mm, compared to a 
cladding thickness of 0.52 mm.  The neutronic, thermal, and hydraulic performance 
characteristics of the ABTR design provide a defensive barrier against reactor damage for 
accident initiators that otherwise progress into severe accident conditions.  
 
2.2  Analysis Scope 
 
The analysis results reported here were selected on the basis that they show the safety margins 
and the inherent ability of a metallic-fueled, sodium-cooled, pool-type reactor system to provide 
protection against severe, damaging consequences. The accident sequences analyzed here are 
near the end of the spectrum of the most pessimistic, challenging, and potentially damaging 
events. The analysis results demonstrate the passive safety performance advantages of ABTR. 
This performance is possible because of the favorable heat transfer and reactivity feedback 
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characteristics of metallic fuel, and the natural circulation shutdown heat removal capability that 
is possible with low pressure sodium coolant in a pool configuration. 
 
2.2.1 Accident Sequences 
 
The basic accident sequence analyzed here is the loss of normal power to the reactor and 
intermediate coolant pumps, with failure of the emergency power supplies. The result is a loss of 
forced flow in the primary and intermediate coolant circuits.  In addition, it is assumed that heat 
removal at the power cycle heat exchanger ceases, so that the only heat removal path is through 
the emergency direct reactor auxiliary cooling system (DRACS). 
 
The natural circulation DRACS consists of heat exchangers located in the cold pool region 
within the reactor vessel, air dump heat exchangers located outside containment, and the 
connecting piping. The working fluid in the DRACS is NaK, and fluid flow is by natural 
circulation. Multiple independent DRACS units are provided for defense in depth. The DRACS 
is designed to remove 0.5% of full power (1250 kW) at normal operating temperatures assuming 
failure of one DRACS unit. The DRACS system operates continuously, with heat losses limited 
in normal operation by dampers on the NaK-to-air heat exchangers. In all the accident sequences 
analyzed here, one DRACS unit is assumed to fail, leaving a nominal system heat rejection 
capacity of 1250 kW. 
 
The initial condition for the accident sequence is normal operation at full power and flow. With 
the loss of pumping power, flow in the primary circuit coasts down according to the spinning 
inertia of the pumps and motors. Following flow coast down, natural circulation flow is 
established. 
 
With the loss of power, forced flow in the intermediate coolant system is also lost. Further, it is 
assumed that heat rejection through the power cycle heat exchanger ceases. The intermediate 
heat transport system (IHTS) is alternately a heat sink or source in the accident sequence, 
depending on its temperature and the primary system temperature at the intermediate heat 
exchanger (IHX). During the transient, natural circulation flow in the IHTS may reverse, 
depending on transient temperature conditions. 
 
Two variations of the loss-of-flow accident sequence have been analyzed. In the first, it is 
assumed that the reactor safety system acts as designed to insert control rods and reduce reactor 
power immediately to decay heat. This sequence is called the protected loss-of-flow (PLOF) 
accident. In the second analysis, it is assumed that the reactor safety system fails to insert the 
scram control rods, and the loss of forced flow proceeds at full power. This sequence is called 
the unprotected loss-of-flow (ULOF). 
 
In the PLOF sequence, the absence of normal shutdown heat removal through the reactor coolant 
system causes a slow system temperature rise following the reactor scram. This temperature 
increase occurs because the DRACS has insufficient heat removal capacity to overcome both the 
early decay heat production rate and the stored heat in the primary and intermediate systems. 
Eventually, the decay heat falls below the DRACS capacity, and the system temperature declines. 
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In the ULOF sequence, the system temperature rises significantly with the flow coast down, but 
the core temperature rise introduces negative reactivity that acts to reduce the reactor fission 
power. The reactor, with its negative feedback characteristic, seeks equilibrium with the 
available heat sink by reducing power. This has the effect of reducing the reactor temperature 
and establishing a quasi-equilibrium condition. However, until the decay heat falls below the 
available heat rejection capacity, the reactor system will continue to heat slowly, with the long 
term temperature rise buffered by the thermal heat inertia of the system. When decay heat 
production falls below the DRACS capacity, the system temperature declines. 
 
2.2.2 Reactor State 
 
Safety analyses were performed for the beginning-of-equilibrium-cycle (BOEC) reactor 
conditions described in Ref. 3. Only the BOEC results are reported here because the EOEC 
results are similar, even though the reactor radial power distribution changes with irradiation. 
 
For the BOEC safety analysis, it was assumed that sufficient irradiation had taken place to swell 
the fuel radially into contact with the cladding. Examination of EBR-II irradiated fuel has 
indicated that fuel-cladding contact will occur early in fuel life (1% burnup), depending on the 
initial geometry and local specific power. Fuel-cladding contact has the impact of lowering 
thermal resistance by eliminating the sodium-filled fuel-cladding gap. 
 
For the PLOF analysis, the decay heat curve was taken as 100% of the ANSI 5.1 standard [4] for 
Pu-239. For the ULOF analysis, the decay heat curve was combined with the computed fission 
power calculated using the reactivity feedback parameters determined by the reactor physics 
analysis of Ref. 3 for the BOEC core. 
 
2.3  Analysis Methods and Input Data 
 
The SASSYS-1 computer code [5] was used to produce all the safety analysis results presented 
here.  New capabilities incorporated for ABTR analyses are described in Appendix B. In the 
following sections, the reactor and coolant system thermal-hydraulic models are described along 
with key input data relevant to the determination of ABTR safety performance. 
 
2.3.1 Reactor Thermal Hydraulics 
 
The thermal-hydraulic performance of the reactor core is analyzed with a geometric model 
consisting of a number of single-pin channels. In a multiple-channel, whole-core model, each 
channel represents a single fuel pin and its associated coolant and structure. The single pin is 
assumed to characterize the average pin in a fuel subassembly, and subassemblies with similar 
reactor physics and thermal-hydraulics characteristics are grouped, so a number of channels are 
selected to represent all the pins in the reactor core. 
 
The geometry assumed in the channel thermal-hydraulic model is shown in Figure 2.3-1. Heat 
generated in the fuel is assumed to travel through the cylindrically-symmetric pin to the upward-
flowing coolant. The structure field is used to represent part of the hexagonal duct and the wire 
wrap. One-dimensional, radial heat transfer calculations are performed at many axial locations to  
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Figure 2.3-1. Single-Pin Channel Model 
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model heat transfer from the fuel through the cladding to the coolant, and from the coolant to the 
structure, the gas plenum, and the reflectors. One-dimensional (axial) coolant mass flow is  
modeled with a momentum equation solution for the axial pressure profile, and convective heat 
transfer conditions are assumed at the interfaces between the coolant and the cladding, the 
reflectors, and the structure. Temperatures are calculated at multiple radial nodes in the fuel, the 
cladding, the reflectors, and the structure. A single bulk temperature is calculated at each axial 
location. Axial heat conduction is neglected. 
 
Thermal, transport, and physical properties data for the coolant were taken as the temperature-
dependent liquid sodium properties available in SASSYS-1. Cladding properties were taken as 
the HT9 data presented in Ref. 6. Fuel properties were taken from the SSCOMP correlations in 
SASSYS-1 Version 3.0; these correlations are based on data generated in the Integral Fast 
Reactor (IFR) Program. 
 
On the basis of the reactor physics calculations reported in Ref. 3, the multiple-channel model 
depicted in Figure 2.3-2 was selected for safety analysis calculations. This model approximates 
the full heterogeneity of the reactor physics model by assigning channels to represent each fuel 
enrichment zone. Channels 1 and 3 represent the average subassemblies in the inner and outer 
enrichment zones respectively, while channel 2 represents the average of the mid-core fuel test 
assemblies. A fourth channel represents all of the non-fuel subassemblies, including the mid-core 
materials test assemblies. A fifth channel is used to represent the peak-power inner-core 
subassembly with fresh fuel. 
 
Table 2.3-1 presents geometric input data employed in the multiple-channel whole-core model. 
In this data, it has been assumed that the irradiated fuel has swollen into contact with the 
cladding. 
 
Figure 2.3-3 shows the initial subassembly powers for the beginning of equilibrium cycle 
(BOEC) condition as described in Ref. 3. The subassembly power for the peak assembly assumes 
fresh fuel in the peak power location. All other subassembly powers represent channel averages 
from BOEC fuel compositions at various stages of depletion. The initial subassembly flow rates 
shown in Figure 2.3-4 were determined such that the mixed-mean coolant outlet temperature was 
510°C for each region (inner core, outer core, fuel test, and reflectors). Flow for the peak 
subassembly was set so that the outlet temperature would be 510°C midway through depletion, 
with the remaining flow for the inner core allocated to channel 1. With fresh fuel in the peak 
subassembly location, the outlet temperature for the peak subassembly is higher than nominal. 
Initial coolant outlet temperatures at BOEC are shown in Figure 2.3-5. 
 
Based on the above input conditions, SASSYS-1 calculates the initial, steady-state thermal-
hydraulic conditions in the reactor core prior to the onset of a transient. Peak coolant outlet, peak 
cladding, and peak fuel temperatures are shown in Figure 2.3-5, 2.3-6, and 2.3-7, respectively. 
Coolant, cladding, and fuel temperatures that arise during a transient are discussed in the relevant 
sections below. 
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Figure 2.3-2. Channel Assignment for Reactor Core Thermal-Hydraulic Model 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3-3. BOEC Initial Subassembly Power (MW) 
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Table 2.3-1. Fuel Assembly, Pin, and Coolant Channel Model Data 
 
Pins per Assembly 217 
Number of Fuel Assemblies 60 
 Channel 1 (Inner Core) 23 
 Channel 2 (Fuel Test) 6 
 Channel 3 (Outer Core) 30 
 Channel 5 (Peak Inner Core) 1 
Fuel Height (mm) 800 
Gas Plenum Height (mm) 1200 
Upper Reflector Height (mm) 300 
Lower Reflector Height (mm) 600 
Axial Node Height (mm)  
 Core 40 
 Gas Plenum 200 
 Upper Reflector 60 
 Lower Reflector 120 
Hydraulic Diameter (mm) 2.972 
Coolant Flow Area per Pin (mm2) 22.69 
Outer Fuel Radius (mm) 3.48 
Inner Cladding Radius (mm) 3.48 
Outer Cladding Radius (mm) 4.00 
Structure Thickness a (mm) 3.45 
Structure Perimeter b (mm) 2.46 
Reflector Thickness (mm) 2.00 
Reflector Perimeter (mm) 25.1 
a. Structure thickness includes weighted contribution 
from the inter-assembly gap sodium. 
b. Structure perimeter includes contribution from wire 
wrap spacers. 
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Figure 2.3-4. Initial Subassembly Coolant Flow (kg/s) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3-5. BOEC Initial Coolant Outlet Temperature (°C) 
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Figure 2.3-6. BOEC Initial Peak Cladding Temperature (°C) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3-7. BOL Initial Peak Fuel Temperature (°C) 
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2.3.2 Coolant Systems Thermal Hydraulics 
 
The coolant systems thermal hydraulics model represents coolant flow and heat transfer in the 
primary and intermediate sodium systems, and in the emergency decay heat removal system, 
with a network of volumes and components connected by flow paths. The coolant systems model 
is shown in Figure 2.3-8. From the inlet plenum, cold coolant flows through the core and is 
heated, then exits to the outlet plenum and travels through the shell side of the intermediate heat 
exchangers (IHXs), where it gives up its heat. Cold primary coolant exits the IHXs and flows to 
the cold pool. The primary coolant pumps take suction from the cold pool and deliver the coolant 
back to the inlet plenum. Emergency decay heat removal is provided by the direct reactor 
auxiliary cooling system (DRACS), a natural circulation system that removes heat by means of a 
heat exchanger in the upper region of the primary circuit cold leg and rejects heat through an air 
dump heat exchanger outside the containment. The working fluid in the DRACS system is NaK. 
 
In the primary coolant circuit, volumes 1 and 2 represent the inlet and outlet plenums, and 
volumes 3 and 4 stand for regions of the primary circuit cold leg. The coolant in volume 4 is 
essentially stagnant. Volumes 5 and 6 simulate the gas expansion volumes in the intermediate 
loop and decay heat removal system, respectively. Design parameters assumed for the volumes 
in the model are shown in Table 2.3-2. All of the volumes in the model are perfectly mixed (i.e. 
characterized by a single temperature) except for the upper region of the cold pool, which is 
treated by a stratification model for low flow conditions. 
 
Volumes in the model are connected by one-dimensional flow segments, which are further 
subdivided into temperature elements for heat transfer calculations. Table 2.3-3 shows the 
parameters assumed for the liquid segments. Flow segment 1 stands for the core channels, and 
flow segment 2 represents the shell side of the IHX. The ABTR has two IHXs, but only a single 
IHX is modeled, and it is assumed in this work that both primary circuits behave identically. 
Segment 4 represents the four primary coolant pumps and the discharge pipes connected to the 
inlet plenum. Segment 5 represents the primary coolant flow path through the decay heat 
removal heat exchanger, and segment 6 connects the upper region of the cold pool with the near 
stagnant lower region. Segment 7 represents the intermediate heat transfer loop including the 
loop piping, intermediate heat exchanger, and intermediate coolant pump. Segment 8 represents 
natural circulation flow in the DRACS loop. In normal operation, heat addition takes place in 
segment 1, and heat is rejected in segments 2 and 5. Segment 2 is thermally connected through 
the IHX to the intermediate loop, and segment 5 is thermally connected to the DRACS loop 
through the DRACS heat exchanger. 
 
In the model, liquid flow segments are divided into a number of elements for the purpose of heat 
transfer and pressure drop calculations. The liquid elements in the coolant systems model are 
described in Table 2.3-4. 
 
Primary and intermediate circuit flows are driven by both forced circulation at the pumps and by 
buoyancy due to heat exchange. Transient natural circulation flows adjust to changes in heat 
generation and transfer. DRACS loop natural circulation flow changes due to temperature 
changes in the DRACS heat exchanger and the air dump heat exchanger. Heat transfer at the air 
dump heat exchanger can be enhanced by opening air flow dampers, normally closed. 
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Figure 2.3-8. Coolant Systems Thermal Hydraulics Model 
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Table 2.3-2. Compressible Volumes Input Data. 
 
Volume 
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Volume 
Description 
Inlet 
Plenum 
Outlet 
Plenum 
Upper 
Cold 
Pool 
Region 
Lower 
Cold 
Pool 
Region 
Intermediate 
Loop 
Junction 
DRACS 
Loop 
Junction 
Total Volume 
(m3) 3.06 92.51 152.97 28.14 6.0 4.0 
Initial Gas 
Volume (m3) - 6.17 60.6 - 1.0 0.6 
Reference 
Liquid 
Elevation (m) 
-0.75 3.0 7.0 0. 18.3 27.0 
Liquid/Gas 
Interface Area 
(m2) 
- 11.16 12.8 - 1.0 0.8 
Wall Surface 
Area (m2) 10.5 16.5 80.0 44.0 13.0 10.0 
Wall Heat 
Capacity 
(MJ/K) 
63.5 0.66 26.87 14.14 1.075 .707 
 
 
Table 2.3-3. Liquid Segments Input Data. 
 
Segment 
Number Description 
Compressible 
Volume 
In/Out 
Inlet 
Elevation 
(m) 
Liquid 
Element 
In/Out 
Initial Flow 
(kg/s) 
1 Reactor Sub- Assemblies 1/2 -0.60 1/1 1264.4 
2 IHX Shell Side 2/3  6.02 2/3 632.2 
3 Intra-Volume Heat Transfer 3/3 4.0 4/4 0.0 
4 Primary  Pump 3/1 3.56 5/8 316.1 
5 DHRX to Cold Pool 3/3 6.035 9/9 0.0 
6 Cold Pool Transition 3/4   -.85 10/10 0.0 
7 Intermediate Loop 5/5 18.2 11/19 634.0 
8 DRACS Loop 6/6 28.0 20/24 0.0 
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Table 2.3-4. Liquid Elements Input Data. 
 
Element 
Number Description 
Outlet 
Elevation 
(m) 
Length 
(m) 
Flow Area 
(m2) 
Hydraulic 
Diameter 
(m) 
1 Reactor  * * * * 
2 IHX Shell  2.17 3.85 0.766 0.0186 
3 IHX Outlet 1.65 0.42 0.3 0.34 
4 Cold Pool HT 6.4 2.4 0.44 0.16 
5 Pump Inlet 3.61 0.05 0.13 0.41 
6 Primary  Pump 3.61 0.05 0.055 0.113 
7 Pump Outlet -0.77 4.38 0.132 0.34 
8 Pump Discharge -0.77 1.26 5.36 1.0 
9 DRACS HX 3.69 2.35 0.024 0.037 
10 CP Transition -.87 0.02 0.092 0.34 
11 IHTS Pipe 13.0 6.4 0.092 0.34 
12 IHTS Pipe 13.0 4.3 0.092 0.34 
13 IHTS Pipe 2.17 10.8 0.092 0.34 
14 IHX Tube 6.02 3.85 0.517 0.014 
15 IHTS Pipe 12.4 6.36 0.092 0.34 
16 IHTS Pipe 12.4 5.2 0.092 0.34 
17 IHTS Pipe 23.3 6.0 0.092 0.34 
18 BOP HX 18.3 4.0 3.6 0.0075 
19 IHTS Pump 18.3 1.0 0.092 0.34 
20 DRACS Pipe 28.0 1.0 0.016 0.14 
21 Air Dump HX 27.0 5.7 0.17 0.05 
22 DRACS Pipe 3.7 23.3 0.016 0.14 
23 Na/NaK HX 6.04 2.35 0.010 0.037 
24 DRACS Pipe 26.9 20.9 0.016 0.14 
* See core channel model in Table 2.3-1. 
 
2.3.3 Reactor Kinetics and Reactivity Feedback 
 
A point kinetics model is employed to calculate the response of reactor fission power to transient 
reactivity feedbacks. At any time, the net reactivity is the sum of a number of individual 
reactivity feedbacks that are determined by the transient thermal, hydraulic, mechanical, and 
neutronic state of the reactor. The feedback reactivities considered are fuel Doppler, coolant 
density, fuel and cladding axial expansion, radial core expansion, and control rod driveline 
thermal expansion. In addition to tracking fission power, a decay heat model is integrated with 
the point kinetics model to track thermal power in sub-critical conditions. 
 
Fuel Doppler feedback is calculated from the spatially-dependent fuel temperature distribution 
and the input spatial distribution of the fuel Doppler reactivity coefficient. In each single-pin 
channel, the axial distribution of the radial pin-average fuel temperature is used to calculate the 
reactivity feedback. 
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Coolant density reactivity feedback is calculated from the spatially dependent coolant density 
distribution and the input distribution of the coolant density reactivity coefficient calculated from 
perturbation theory. The reactivity feedback data is entered as a coolant void worth (the negative 
of the coolant mass worth). 
 
Transient fuel and cladding temperatures are used to predict fuel and cladding axial dimension 
changes, and in each single-pin channel the reactivity feedbacks associated with fuel and 
cladding axial expansion are computed from first order perturbation theory. 
 
A simple radial core expansion model accounts for core dilation due to thermal expansion of the 
above-core load pads and thermal expansion of the core support grid plate. Reactivity feedback 
is then calculated from the computed core dimension change and an input linear reactivity 
coefficient based on stand-alone neutronics eigenvalue calculations. 
 
For the control-rod driveline feedback model, it is assumed that the control rod drivelines are 
washed by the outlet coolant from the core. Thermal expansion of the drivelines due to a rise in 
core outlet temperature will cause the control rods to be inserted further into the core, providing 
a negative reactivity component. On the other hand, if the control rod drives are supported on the 
vessel head, and if the core is supported by the vessel walls, then heating the vessel walls will 
lower the core, leading to a positive reactivity component. In the present model, both control-rod 
driveline expansion and vessel wall expansion are treated. 
 
2.4 Analysis Results 
 
Analyses of the protected loss-of-flow (PLOF) and unprotected loss-of-flow (ULOF) accident 
sequences were performed with coupled heat transfer, thermal-hydraulics, and reactor kinetics 
models available in the SASSYS-1 code. These models have been validated through many 
applications to EBR-II and FFTF transient tests. Additionally, temperature criteria for 
assessments of cladding damage thresholds have been established by results from testing of 
metallic fuel in EBR-II and TREAT. Consequently, there is high confidence that the detailed 
results from the PLOF and ULOF accident analyses presented here give a true characterization of 
the physical performance that could be obtained in the ABTR design. 
 
2.4.1 Protected Loss-of-Flow (PLOF) Accident Sequence 
 
Results from analysis of the PLOF accident sequence are shown in Figure 2.3-9, -10, -11 and -12. 
Figures 2.3-9 and -10 show the history of the reactor power, the decay heat power, the DRACS 
heat removal rate and the coolant flows through the highest temperature subassembly (Channel 
5) and an average temperature subassembly (Channel 3). Recall that this transient is initiated by 
a complete loss of forced coolant flow in the primary and intermediate loops, save the flow 
coast-downs. Both the primary and intermediate pump systems are designed with sufficient flow 
inertia to give initial flow halving times of 7 seconds. The primary pumps cease operation at 
about 450 seconds after the start of the transient, leading to a transition to natural circulation. The 
transition to natural circulation goes more smoothly in the hotter Channel 5 than in the cooler 
Channel 3. Almost immediately at initiation, the reactor control system scrams the  
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Figure 2.3-9. PLOF Power and Flow History, Early Times 
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Figure 2.3-10. PLOF Power and Flow History, Extended Times 
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Figure 2.3-11. PLOF Temperature History, Early Times
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Figure 2.3-12. PLOF Temperature History, Extended Times
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reactor, beginning the power reduction to decay heat shown in Figure 2.3-9, and the dampers on 
the DRACS air dump heat exchangers open, permitting the DRACS to operate at its full capacity 
of 0.5%. As the cold pool temperature rises, DRACS heat removal capacity increases, eventually 
reaching the equivalent of 0.7% of normal reactor power. Not indicated in this figure is the loss 
of heat removal to the balance-of-plant, which is assumed to occur after the first 10 seconds. 
Figure 2.3-10 shows that the reactor decay heat power equals the DRACS heat removal capacity 
at about 5 hours into the transient. 
 
Figure 2.3-11 shows the early reactor temperature histories during the coolant flow coast down 
and transition to natural circulation. During this and the following time, the only heat removal is 
through the DRACS. The rapid reactor power decrease due to the scram initially lowers the 
coolant and cladding temperatures in the core. Then the drop in core flow as the pumps coast 
down leads to a rise in core coolant and cladding temperatures. As mentioned above the 
transition to natural circulation is smoother in Channel 5 than in Channel 3. In channel 3 as the 
primary pumps stop turning the coolant flow rate temporarily drops to very low values, leading 
to higher peak coolant and cladding temperatures. This short-term cladding temperature rise may 
result in some fuel-cladding chemical interaction, but no cladding failure would occur.  
 
A temperature stratification model is used for the cold pool.  Early in the transient, heat removal 
from the IHX stops.  After that the hot coolant entering the cold pool from the IHX outlets rises 
to the upper part of the cold pool, forming a hot layer.  The cooler discharge from the DRACS 
heat exchangers falls to the bottom of the cold pool, forming a cold layer.  This thermal 
stratification enhances the natural circulation performance of the system.  The inlets to the 
DRACS heat exchangers are located in the hot upper part of the cold pool.  On the other hand, 
the pump inlets are in the cooler lower layer, reducing the core inlet temperature. 
 
The magnitude of the temperature stratification effect in the cold pool is indicated by the 
temperatures plotted in Figures 2.3-11 and -12.  For most of the transient the temperature in the 
upper stratified layer of the cold pool is approximately equal to the hot pool temperature; 
whereas the temperature in the lower layer is approximately equal to the inlet plenum 
temperature.  This temperature difference is approximately 100oC.  Note that the “Cold Pool” 
temperature plotted in these figures is the average temperature of the axially stratified 
distribution. 
 
As the system temperature rises in the early part of the transient, DRACS heat removal capability 
increases due to an increase in NaK flow and heat rejection at the air dump heat exchangers. The 
decay heat production declines throughout the transient, until it becomes equal to the DRACS 
heat removal at 5 hours. As shown in Figure 2.3-12, the cold pool temperatures reach long-term 
peak values at about this time, and then uniformly decrease as the whole system cools. 
 
The significance of the PLOF analysis results is emphasized in Figure 2.3-11 which shows the 
initial peak cladding temperature (522°C) in channel 3, compared to the short-term transient peak 
cladding temperature of 750°C and the long-term peak cladding temperature just above 500°C at 
around 4 hours. In the PLOF transient, no cladding failures would occur, and the long-term peak 
temperatures in the accident are lower than the normal operating temperatures. Stated in another 
way, the long-term temperature safety margins in the accident are greater than the margins at the 
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normal operating conditions. This very significant result is obtained as a result of the natural 
circulation capabilities of the reactor coolant system and the DRACS. 
 
2.4.2 Unprotected Loss-of-Flow (ULOF) Accident Sequence 
 
The ULOF transient is initiated by the same set of failures as for the PLOF accident (loss of 
forced flow and loss of normal heat rejection). However, for the ULOF case, the reactor control 
system also fails to scram the reactor; so the accident proceeds from full power. All heat 
rejection is through the DRACS, with a design heat rejection of 0.5% of full power at nominal 
conditions. Results from the analysis of the ULOF accident sequence are shown in Figure 2.3-13 
through Figure 2.3-15. 
 
Figure 2.3-13 shows the histories for the total reactor power, the decay heat production, and the 
coolant flow in channel 5 (the peak inner core assembly). The power-to-flow imbalance during 
the first 800 seconds results in significant transient reactor heating. Peak fuel, peak clad, and 
coolant outlet temperatures for channel 5 are shown in Figure 2.3-14. Coolant and cladding 
temperatures increase to approximately 600°C within the first 30 seconds. This heating causes 
the reactivity feedbacks shown in Figure 2.3-15. Axial and radial expansions are the main 
contributors to the initial negative reactivity feedback, which causes power and fuel temperatures 
to decline. Reduced fuel temperatures provide a positive Doppler feedback, although the 
magnitude is modest due to the high thermal conductivity and relatively low operating 
temperatures of metallic fuel. Shortly after the onset of the transient, higher-temperature coolant 
begins washing over and heating the control-rod drivelines. As the drivelines expand, an 
additional negative reactivity component is introduced, as shown in Figure 2.3-15. 
 
The flow coast-down provided by the inertia of the primary pumps ends at approximately 450 
seconds. At this point, natural circulation has not yet been fully established, and fuel, cladding, 
and local coolant temperatures begin to rise to form a second temperature peak at approximately 
480 seconds. The increased temperatures provide the necessary driving force to establish natural 
circulation flow and the coolant flow rate in channel 5 (the peak inner core assembly) begins to 
increase. While the second temperature peak also causes considerable thermal expansion and 
negative reactivity feedback, fission power has already been significantly reduced, and residual 
heating is dominated by decay heat. Therefore, the dramatic changes in reactivity feedback 
(particularly radial expansion) have negligible impact on subsequent transient development. 
 
As natural circulation is being established, the peak in the coolant temperature moves up through 
the core and to the subassembly outlet. While the delay in observing the temperature peak at the 
outlet is partly due to the low flow conditions, a bigger contributor to the delay is the large 
thermal inertia of the structural materials above the core, which must all be heated before the 
temperature peak reaches the outlet. Nevertheless, the development of natural circulation reduces 
peak fuel and cladding temperatures back to around 600°C. Beyond 800 seconds, the normalized 
power-to-flow falls below unity, and the temperature difference from inlet to outlet falls below 
that of normal operating conditions. In the long term, once the decay heat falls below the heat 
rejection capability of the DRACS, overall system temperatures will begin to decline. 
 
 
 28
0.01
0.1
1
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Time (s)
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 P
ow
er
 o
r F
lo
w
Decay Power
Power
Inlet Flow
 
Figure 2.3-13. ULOF Transient Total Power and Channel 5 Flow 
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Figure 2.3-14. ULOF Transient Temperatures for Channel 5 
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Figure 2.3-15. ULOF Transient Reactivity Feedback 
 
The significance of the ULOF accident analysis results is captured in Figure 2.3-14. As shown 
for channel 5, the peak fuel, cladding, and coolant temperatures remain well below the coolant 
saturation (boiling) temperature, with a minimum margin to coolant boiling of nearly 300°C. The 
analysis suggests that the core would survive an unprotected loss-of-flow accident without pin 
failures or significant fuel damage. This very favorable result comes about because of 1) the high 
thermal conductivity and relatively low operating temperature of metallic fuel, 2) the capability 
of a sodium-cooled reactor in a pool-type primary system to remove decay heat in natural 
circulation, and 3) the beneficial negative reactivity feedback coefficients and reactor physics 
performance of metallic fuel. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Evaluation of Safety Design Criteria for Application to 
Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Reactor 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
  
This Appendix provides a survey of safety design criteria applicable to liquid 
metal cooled fast reactors (LMRs).  Criteria selected for consideration include 1) 
generalized design criteria specified by Title 10, Part 50, Appendix A of the Code 
of Federal Regulations for application to light water nuclear power reactors, 2) 
American National Standard general safety design criteria for a liquid metal 
reactor nuclear power plant, and 3) U.S. Department of Energy nuclear reactor 
safety design criteria.  Considerations of design criteria by U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission in licensing and safety evaluation of proposed liquid 
metal cooled nuclear power reactor designs are reviewed.  Applicability of the 
selected set of design criteria to LMR plant design features and operational 
characteristics are discussed.  Recommendations are made for modifications to 
existing safety design criteria for relevance to LMR system designs. 
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A.1 Introduction 
  
The safety philosophy guiding the design, construction, and operation of nuclear facilities in the 
U.S. is based on the principle of “defense in depth” [A1].  The objectives of “defense in depth’ 
are first to protect the health and safety of the public and plant operating personnel, and second 
to preserve the facility investment by assuring its operational readiness.  In terms of physical 
elements, “defense in depth” is exemplified by multiple, successive barriers to guard against the 
escape of radioactivity from nuclear facilities.  However, in the evolution of U.S. nuclear safety 
philosophy, the “defense in depth” principle has been extended and applied to all aspects of 
nuclear facility design, construction, and operation, so that all safety critical functions are 
achieved by multiple systems/procedures/processes that are diverse and independent.  
 
In the nuclear facility design process, the “defense in depth” principle has fostered the 
development of guidelines for identifying those engineered systems that are important for safety.  
Safety class systems are designed to be very reliable.  They are constructed using specifications 
and materials that will assure functionality.  In addition, multiple systems of diverse design are 
provided so that failure of any single safety system will not put people or equipment at risk. 
 
The system configurations and functional requirements for nuclear facilities are routinely 
documented early in the design process as a set of safety design criteria.   Commercial water 
cooled nuclear power plants licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission must comply 
with general design criteria documented in the Code of Federal Regulations [A2].  Suggestions 
for modifications of these criteria for application to liquid metal cooled reactor designs have 
been supplied by representatives of the nuclear power industry [A3].  Nuclear research reactors 
built by the U.S. Department of Energy must comply with safety design criteria documented in a 
DOE Order [A4].   
 
The purpose of this report is to provide a resolution of documented nuclear reactor safety design 
criteria, with the aim of identifying changes necessary for application to a liquid metal-cooled 
fast reactor (LMR) design.  Existing general design criteria developed by the USNRC for light 
water reactors [A2], by industry for liquid metal reactors [A3], and by USDOE for research 
reactors [A4] are examined for relevance. Recommendations are made for modifications to the 
existing safety design criteria for application to sodium-cooled LMR system designs. 
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 A.2 Safety Design Criteria Comparison 
 
In the methodological framework built on the defense-in-depth foundation, the role of safety 
design criteria is to set requirements for design performance.  During the formative stages of 
design development, safety design criteria specify the configuration and functional performance 
characteristics the design must have for it to receive construction and operation approvals from 
the regulatory agency.  Once the design is developed, safety analyses are performed and 
documented to quantify the margins between the safety requirements and expected performance.  
After the design is constructed, safety tests are performed to verify design safety performance.  
Therefore, it is necessary to establish safety design criteria early in the design process, and the 
requirements set by the safety design criteria largely determine the plant configuration, 
equipment inventory, and equipment arrangement. 
 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has developed a set of general safety design criteria 
for commercial light water-cooled nuclear power reactors [A2].  These criteria are documented 
in Appendix A of Title 10, Part 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10CFR50 Appendix A).  
As documented, these criteria are the base-line requirements for nuclear power reactors in the 
U.S.  However, the 10CFR50 Appendix A requirements are intended for application to light 
water reactors, and so are only partly applicable to the liquid metal cooled reactor designs. 
 
During the years of the U.S. liquid metal reactor development program, industry representatives 
developed an American National Standard [A3] for safety design criteria applicable to liquid 
metal-cooled reactors.  This set of criteria followed the organization and intent of 10CFR50 
Appendix A, but modified certain criteria details for applicability to the low pressure, chemically 
reactive liquid metal coolant. 
 
The U.S. Department of Energy has developed a set of safety design criteria [A4] to apply to 
USDOE reactors that are exempt from USNRC regulation.  Such reactors include one-of-a-kind 
designs built for research, and other special purpose reactors.  The USDOE criteria are similar in 
organization and intent to the 10CFR50 Appendix A criteria, with some variations to address 
generically the design variations of the USDOE reactors. 
 
Table A1 contains a listing of the design criteria from 10CFR50 Appendix A, and a cross 
reference to the criteria proposed in Refs. A3 and A4.  These three sets of safety design criteria 
have been reviewed for applicability to the liquid metal-cooled reactor design.  The “Comments” 
column in Table A1 references the list of comment statements that follow the Table and record 
the results of the review.  The review takes into account the technical safety evaluations 
performed by the USNRC for the PRISM [A5] and SAFR [A6] liquid metal reactor designs. 
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Table A1.  Safety Design Criteria Cross Comparison. 
 
 
Criterion/Requirement 10CFR50, App. A 
ANSI/ANS 
54.1 
DOE 
5480.30 Comments
I. Overall Requirements     
Single Failure   8.c.1 1,2 
Quality Standards and Records GDC 1 3.1.1 8.c.2 1 
Design Bases for Protection Against 
Natural Phenomena GDC 2 3.1.2 8.c.3 1 
Fire Protection GDC 3 3.1.3 8.c.4 1 
Protection Against Sodium and NaK 
Reactions  3.1.4  3 
Environmental and Dynamics Effects 
Design Bases GDC 4 3.1.5 
8.c.5, 
8.c.10 4 
Sharing of Structures, Systems, and 
Components GDC 5 3.1.6 8.c.6 1 
Sodium Heating Systems  3.1.7  3 
Siting   8.c.7 5 
Human Factors Engineering   8.c.9 6 
Safeguards and Security   8.c.11 6 
Reactor Decontamination and 
Decommissioning   8.c.13 6 
Support Systems   8.c.15 6 
Non-Safety Class Structures, Systems, 
and Components   8.c.16 6 
II. Protection by Multiple Fission 
Product Barriers     
Reactor Design GDC 10 3.2.1 8.d.3.a 1 
Reactor Inherent Protection GDC 11 3.2.2 8.d.3.b 7 
Suppression of Reactor Power 
Oscillations GDC 12 3.2.3 8.d.3.c 1 
Instrumentation and Control GDC 13 3.2.4 8.d.5.a 1 
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary GDC 14 3.2.5 8.d.1.a 1 
Reactor Coolant System Design GDC 15 3.2.6 8.d.6.a 8 
Containment Design GDC 16 3.2.7 8.c.8 1 
Electric Power Systems GDC 17 3.2.8 8.d.2.a 1 
Inspection and Testing of Electric 
Power Systems GDC 18 3.2.9 8.d.2.b 1 
Control Room GDC 19 3.2.10 8.d.5.e 1 
Remote Shutdown   8.d.5.f 9 
Heating, Ventilation, and Air 
Conditioning (HVAC) Systems   8.d.7.a,b,c 10 
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Table A1.  Safety Design Criteria Cross Comparison (cont.) 
 
 
Criterion/Requirement  10CFR50, App. A 
ANSI/ANS 
54.1 
DOE 
5480.30 Comments 
III. Protection and Reactivity Control 
Systems     
Protection System Functions GDC 20 3.3.1 8.d.4.a 1 
Protection System Reliability and Testing GDC 21 3.3.2 8.d.4.a 1 
Protection System Independence GDC 22 3.3.3 8.d.4.b 1 
Protection System Failure Modes GDC 23 3.3.4 8.d.4.c 1 
Separation of Protection and Control 
Systems GDC 24 3.3.5 8.d.4.d 1 
Protection System Requirements for 
Reactivity Control Malfunctions GDC 25 3.3.6 8.d.4.e 1 
Reactivity Control System Redundancy 
and Capability GDC 26 3.3.7 8.d.5.b 11 
Combined Reactivity Control Systems 
Capability GDC 27 3.3.8 8.d.5.c 11 
Reactivity Limits GDC 28 3.3.9 8.d.5.d 11 
Protection Against Anticipated 
Operational Occurrences GDC 29 3.3.10 8.d.4.f 1 
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Table A1.  Safety Design Criteria Cross Comparison (cont.) 
 
 
Criterion/Requirement 10CFR50, App. A 
ANSI/ANS 
54.1 
DOE 
5480.30 Comments 
IV. Fluid Systems     
Assurance of Adequate Reactor Coolant 
Inventory  3.4.1  12 
Quality of Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary GDC 30 3.4.2 8.d.1.b 1 
Fracture Prevention of Reactor Coolant 
Pressure Boundary GDC 31 3.4.13 8.d.1.c 4 
Inspection of Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary GDC 32 3.4.3 8.d.1.d 1 
Reactor Coolant Makeup GDC 33  8.d.6.c 13 
Reactor and Intermediate Coolant and 
Cover Gas Purity Control  3.4.4  14 
Intermediate Coolant System  3.4.5  14 
Inspection and Surveillance of 
Intermediate Coolant Boundary  3.4.6  14 
Residual Heat Removal GDC 34 3.4.7 8.d.6.b 1 
Emergency Core Cooling GDC 35  8.d.6.d 13 
Inspection of Emergency Core Cooling 
System GDC 36 3.4.8 8.d.6.d 15 
Testing of Emergency Core Cooling 
System GDC 37 3.4.9 8.d.6.d 15 
Containment Heat Removal GDC 38  8.c.8 16 
Inspection of Containment Heat Removal 
System GDC 39  8.c.8 16 
Testing of Containment Heat Removal 
System GDC 40  8.c.8 16 
Containment Atmosphere  Cleanup GDC 41 3.5.11 8.c.8 16 
Inspection of Containment  Atmosphere 
Cleanup Systems GDC 42 3.5.12 8.c.8 16 
Testing of Containment  Atmosphere 
Cleanup Systems GDC 43 3.5.13 8.c.8 16 
Cooling Water  GDC 44 3.4.10 8.d.6.e 1 
Inspection of Cooling Water  System GDC 45 3.4.11 8.d.6.e 1 
Testing of Cooling Water System GDC 46 3.4.12 8.d.6.e 1 
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Table A1.  Safety Design Criteria Cross Comparison (cont.) 
 
 
Criterion/Requirement 10CFR50, App. A 
ANSI/ANS 
54.1 
DOE 
5480.30 Comments 
V. Reactor Containment     
Containment Design Basis GDC 50 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.5.3 8.c.8 17 
Fracture Prevention of Containment 
Pressure Boundary GDC 51 3.5.4 8.c.8 1 
Capability for Containment Leakage 
Rate Testing GDC 52 3.5.5 8.c.8 1 
Provisions for Containment Testing 
and Inspection GDC 53 3.5.6 8.c.8 1 
Piping Systems Penetrating 
Containment GDC 54 3.5.7 8.c.8 1 
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 
Penetrating Containment GDC 55 3.5.8 8.c.8 1 
Primary Containment Isolation GDC 56 3.5.9 8.c.8 1 
Closed System Isolation Valves GDC 57 3.5.10 8.c.8 1 
VI. Fuel and Radioactivity Control    
Control of Releases of Radioactive 
Materials to the Environment GDC 60 3.6.1 
8.c.12.a, 
8.c.14 1 
Fuel Storage and Handling and 
Radioactivity Control GDC 61 3.6.2 8.d.8.a 1 
Prevention of Criticality in Fuel 
Storage and Handling GDC 62 3.6.3 8.d.8.b 1 
Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage GDC 63 3.6.4 8.d.8.c 1 
Monitoring Radioactivity Releases GDC 64 3.6.5 8.c.12.b, 8.c.14 1 
 
 
 
Comment 1.  The relevant criteria from Refs. A2, A3, and A4 are essentially congruent in intent 
and are applicable to the liquid metal-cooled reactor design. 
 
Comment 2.  The single failure criterion for safety class structures, systems, and components is 
listed as a definition applied to specified criteria in Refs. A2 and A3.  The single failure criterion 
is explicit in Ref. A4. 
 
Comment 3.  Explicit requirement for liquid metal coolant that considers the impact of chemical 
reactivity or thermophysical properties. 
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Comment 4.  The 10CFR50 criterion addresses phenomena for a high pressure water system.  
The criteria should be revised to address phenomena relevant to low pressure, chemically 
reactive liquid metal coolant. 
 
Comment 5.  Siting criteria are considered in 10CFR100. 
 
Comment 6.  Explicit USDOE requirement beyond the scope of 10CFR50 Appendix A. 
 
Comment 7.  In LWR designs, the requirement for a prompt, negative power coefficient is met 
by the combination of the negative fuel Doppler coefficient and the negative moderator density 
coefficient.  If the LMR coolant void coefficient is positive, the regulator may require additional 
design features to compensate, as noted in the PRISM [A5] and SAFR [A6] safety evaluation 
reports. 
 
Comment 8.  Systems cited should include the liquid metal heating system. 
 
Comment 9.  The USDOE separate requirement for a remote shutdown capability is included in 
GDC 19. 
 
Comment 10.  USDOE criterion for confinement superseded by containment criterion, GDC 16. 
 
Comment 11.  10CFR50 Appendix A criteria contain references to LWR specific reactivity 
mechanisms (Xe, cold shutdown, ECCS boron injection, rod dropout, cold coolant shock) that 
are either irrelevant or require re-interpretation for fast spectrum LMR.  
 
Comment 12.  Liquid metal reactor criterion for maintaining core submersion in coolant is the 
equivalent of ECCS requirement for light water reactor (GDC 33, 35). 
 
Comment 13.  10CFR50 Appendix A criterion is not applicable for liquid metal coolant. 
 
Comment 14.  Intermediate loop criteria for liquid metal cooled design. 
 
Comment 15.  The liquid metal reactor design does not include an ECCS, but inspection and 
testing requirements are applied to the residual heat removal system. 
 
Comment 16.  In the light water reactor design, the containment heat removal system is intended 
to reduce temperature and pressure following a loss-of-coolant accident.  Because such an 
accident sequence is not a design basis for the liquid metal cooled reactor, this criterion may not 
be relevant. 
 
Comment 17.  In the light water reactor design the containment design is based on loss of coolant 
accident consequences.  For the low pressure liquid metal cooled reactor, in which a pipe break 
event is much less severe (leak before break), an alternative design basis accident must be 
specified. 
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A.3 Evaluation of Safety Design Criteria 
 
The cross comparison of safety design criteria in Table A1 shows that the sets of design criteria 
defined by the USNRC [A2], the ANS [A3], and the USDOE [A4] are generally and specifically 
convergent with regard to scope and content.  The NRC design criteria are intended for 
application to light water cooled power reactors, and the ANS criteria were proposed for liquid 
metal (sodium) cooled reactors. 
 
In its safety evaluation reports for the PRISM [A5] and SAFR [A6] designs, the USNRC has 
provided analyses of the applicability of the criteria in Ref. A2 to specific liquid metal reactor 
designs, taking Ref. A3 into account.  These analyses have been reviewed with a perspective of 
the general characteristics of a liquid metal (sodium) cooled fast reactor system.  From this 
review, the following general statements can be made with regard to the applicability of the 
design criteria in Ref. A2 to sodium cooled systems: 
 
1. Many of the 10CFR50 Appendix A general design criteria are directly applicable to the 
liquid sodium cooled, fast reactor systems, without wording changes or modifications.  
The intent of the design criterion is clear, and the design implication for application to a 
liquid sodium cooled system is apparent.  Criteria included in this class are GDCs 1, 2, 3, 
5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 
53, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64. 
 
2. Some of the 10CFR50 Appendix A general design criteria are worded with reference to 
specific light water reactor design features, performance characteristics, or regulatory 
requirements.  These criteria must be reworded to preserve the original intent for liquid 
sodium cooling.  A listing of the criteria in this class and identification of necessary 
rewording are given in Table A2. 
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Table A2.  Wording Changes Needed to10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criteria for  
Application to Sodium Cooled Systems 
 
GDC No. Wording Change Needed 
4 This criterion is written in reference to a high pressure, water coolant, 
and includes explicit references to loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) 
and pipe ruptures.  The words should be changed 1) to include dynamic 
and environmental phenomena relevant to low pressure sodium, e.g. the 
environmental effects of aerosols and oxidation products, 2) to delete 
references to dynamic and environmental accident phenomena specific 
to water coolant, and 3) to include references to generic design basis 
events, i.e. “anticipated operational occurrences.”  
11 This criterion requires a prompt inherent nuclear feedback effect to 
compensate a rapid reactivity increase in the power operating range.  
NRC reviews of the PRISM and SAFR designs highlighted the positive 
coolant void reactivity worth as an area of significant concern for a 
beyond-design-basis loss-of-flow-without-scram accident sequence.  
The criterion should be modified to specifically exclude or include 
coolant voiding effects, depending on the safety strategy dealing with 
severe accident. 
15 This criterion is written to require that the reactor coolant pressure 
boundary be built to withstand design basis conditions.  Reference A5 
specifically requires inclusion of the sodium heating system in the 
listing of coolant systems subject to this requirement. 
26 This criterion requires two independent reactivity control systems, one 
of which shall use control rods.  Specific control reactivity 
requirements are listed in terms of LWR performance characteristics.  
The criterion should be rewritten in terms of equivalent LMR 
characteristics. 
27 This criterion specifies combined control reactivity requirements 
including liquid poison injection.  The criterion should be rewritten to 
eliminate the explicit mention of liquid poison addition.   
28 This criterion requires that the reactivity control system be designed to 
limit the possible rate of reactivity addition to avoid damage to the 
reactor and its associated structures, systems, and components.  
Specific control reactivity requirements are listed in terms of LWR 
performance characteristics.  The criterion should be rewritten in terms 
of equivalent LMR characteristics. 
31 This criterion specifies conditions and phenomena to be considered in 
the design of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.  For liquid sodium 
coolant, Ref. A5 specifies addition of coolant chemistry and 
mechanical properties degradation to the list of considered phenomena, 
in recognition of the chemically active nature of sodium.   
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Table A2.  Wording Changes Needed to 10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criteria for  
Application to Sodium Cooled Systems (cont.) 
 
GDC No. Wording Change Needed 
33 This criterion provides for a coolant supply system to assure reactor 
coolant inventory in the event of a small break in the coolant pressure 
boundary.  As formulated, the criterion is not relevant to low pressure 
sodium coolant.  Reference A3 specifies a replacement criterion 
dealing with assurance of adequate coolant inventory to maintain core 
cover and operation of the residual heat removal system in all cases. 
35 This criterion provides for emergency core cooling in the event of a 
loss of coolant accident.  Such an event is outside the design basis for 
the low pressure sodium coolant system.  Coolant inventory, core 
covering, and residual heat removal are assured by GDC 33 and 34. 
36 This criterion provides for inspection of the emergency core cooling 
system.  Reference A5 recommends rewriting this criterion to provide 
for inspection of the residual heat removal system (GDC 34). 
37 This criterion provides for testing of the emergency core cooling 
system.  Reference A5 recommends rewriting this criterion to provide 
for testing of the residual heat removal system (GDC 34). 
38 This criterion provides for the design of a containment heat removal 
system with the capability of rapidly reducing the temperature and 
pressure within the containment following a loss-of-coolant accident.  
The LOCA sequence is not relevant to the low pressure coolant liquid 
metal system.  The criterion should be rewritten with wording to 
replace the LOCA reference with the appropriate design basis accident 
reference. 
39 This criterion provides for inspection of the containment heat removal 
system, and includes specific reference to design features relevant to 
water cooled systems.  The criterion should be rewritten to include 
design characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems. 
40 This criterion provides for testing of the containment heat removal 
system, and includes specific reference to design features relevant to 
water cooled systems.  The criterion should be rewritten to include 
design characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems. 
41 This criterion provides for the design of a system to control fission 
gases and combustible gases in containment following a postulated 
accident.  Reference A3 recommends modification of this criterion to 
include sodium aerosols and combustion products, and to identify 
sodium leakage and interaction with concrete as events in the accident 
sequence.  The criterion should be rewritten to include design 
characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems. 
42 This criterion provides for inspection of the containment atmosphere 
cleanup system provided by GDC 41.  The criterion should be rewritten 
to include design characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems. 
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Table A2.  Wording Changes Needed to 10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criteria for  
Application to Sodium Cooled Systems (cont.) 
 
GDC No. Wording Change Needed 
43 This criterion provides for testing of the containment atmosphere 
cleanup system provided by GDC 41.  The criterion should be rewritten 
to include design characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems. 
50 This criterion stipulates design basis conditions and phenomena for the 
containment, and makes specific mention of loss-of-cooling accidents 
and metal-water interactions.  The criterion should be rewritten to 
include design characteristics relevant to sodium cooled systems.  
Reference A5 recommends replacement of the LOCA sequence with 
the appropriate postulated accident, and replacement of metal-water 
interactions with phenomena relevant to sodium cooling. 
55 This criterion provides for isolation design requirements for lines 
connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary that penetrate the 
containment.  In liquid metal cooled systems, this criterion also applies 
to lines connected to the reactor cover gas space. 
 
 
Reference A5 identifies nine additional design criteria relevant to liquid metal (sodium) cooled 
nuclear plant designs that are not explicitly stated in 10CFR50 Appendix A.  Six of these 
additional nine criteria are also cited in Ref. A3.  These nine criteria are as follows: 
 
1. Protection Against Sodium Reactions.  (Cited in Ref. A3 as Criterion 3.1.4).  This 
criterion explicitly provides for measures to protect against the consequences of chemical 
reactions resulting from sodium leaks.  It calls for prevention, detection, and consequence 
mitigation design features, as well as measures to protect personnel and equipment from 
corrosive and potentially radioactive oxidation products. 
 
2. Sodium Heating Systems.  (Cited in Ref. A3 as Criterion 3.1.7).  This criterion provides 
safety and performance requirements for systems intended to maintain sodium as a liquid.  
Such systems are required to perform assuming a single failure. 
 
3. Heat Transport System Design.  (No corresponding Criterion in Ref. A3).  This 
requirement ensures sufficient reactor cooling for normal operation and anticipated 
operational occurrences by providing two independent coolant flow paths between the 
reactor and the heat sinks, and stipulates that the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure 
boundary shall be maintained for postulated accidents.  This criterion covers the same 
requirements as GDCs 34 (Residual Heat Removal), 35 (Emergency Core Cooling), and 
44 (Cooling Water) in the original 10CFR50 Appendix A. 
 
4. Assurance of Adequate Reactor Coolant Inventory.  (Cited as Criterion 3.4.1 in Ref. A3).  
This criterion provides for sufficient coolant inventory to assure residual heat removal for 
normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and postulated accidents assuming 
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a single failure.  The criterion has the same intent as the original GDC 33 (Reactor 
Coolant Makeup). 
 
5. Design of the Intermediate Coolant System.  (Cited as Criteria 3.4.5 and 3.4.6 in Ref. A3).  
These criteria provide for the design, inspection, testing, and surveillance of the 
intermediate coolant system, and cover the intent of the original GDCs 44, 45, and 46 
(Cooling Water). 
 
6. Reactor and Intermediate Coolant and Cover Gas Purity Control.  (Cited as Criterion 
3.4.4 in Ref. A3).  This criterion requires systems to monitor and maintain the purity of 
reactor and intermediate coolants and cover gases within specified design limits.  
 
7. Inspection and Testing of Residual Heat Removal Systems.  (Cited as Criteria 3.4.8 and 
3.4.9 in Ref. A3).  This criterion provides for inspection, testing, and surveillance of the 
residual heat removal system.  The intent of these criteria is the same as that of the 
original GDCs 36 and 37, which provide for inspection and testing of the emergency core 
cooling system for water cooled reactor designs. 
 
8. Protection Against Fuel Rod Failure Propagation.  (No corresponding Criterion in Ref. 
A3).  This criterion was proposed for early liquid metal reactor design for which fuel 
irradiation experience was limited.  As fuel irradiation experience was gained, confidence 
in fuel performance was assured, and this criterion was explicitly excluded in Ref. A5, 
which notes that fuel design limits and failure performance are included by GDCs 10, 27, 
and 35. 
 
9. Protection Against Coolant Flow Blockage.  (No corresponding Criterion in Ref. A3).  
This criterion requires the fuel assembly design to include specific features to prevent and 
minimize the likelihood of coolant flow blockages, so that such events can be eliminated 
from the design basis.  This consideration arises due to use of ducted fuel assemblies, for 
which inlet flow blockages or restrictions could lead to fuel damage or failure. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Capabilities and Enhancements for ABTR Analysis 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This Appendix provides an overview of the computer program and methods 
employed for ABTR analysis.  Two modeling features were enhanced for the 
ABTR analyses, namely 1) modeling of long-term decay heat from transuranic 
fuel, and 2) modeling of coolant volume temperature stratification for buoyancy-
driven natural circulation flow. 
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B.1 SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Computer Code 
 
The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 computer code [B1] was developed at Argonne National Laboratory for 
transient analysis of liquid metal cooled reactors (LMRs).  Originally designed to address the 
consequences of loss-of-decay-heat-removal accidents, SASSYS-1 evolved into a tool to analyze 
passive safety response mechanisms in anticipated transients without scram (ATWS), and as a 
margin assessment tool for design basis accidents (DBAs).  To fulfill this role, SASSYS-1 
contains models for fuel element heat transfer and reactor coolant hydraulics.  In addition, 
SASSYS-1 has the capability to provide a detailed thermal/hydraulic simulation of the primary 
and secondary coolant circuits, as well as the balance-of-plant (BOP) circuits.  The liquid metal 
and BOP circuit models include component models for heat exchangers, pumps, valves, steam 
generators, turbines, and condensers, and thermal/hydraulic models of pipes and plena.  
SASSYS-1 also contains a control system model, which provides digital representations of 
reactor control systems, pump and valve controllers, and their response to input signal changes.  
SASSYS-1 served as the computational engine in a multi-tasking, workstation-based simulator 
for the EBR-II power plant. 
 
SASSYS-1 contains detailed, mechanistic models for fuel element heat transfer (two-
dimensional fuel, cladding, coolant, and structure temperatures), oxide and metallic fuel pin and 
cladding mechanics (steady-state characterization and transient response), single and two-phase 
coolant fluid dynamics (coolant boiling, post-failure fission gas transport), 
primary/secondary/balance-of-plant thermal hydraulics, and plant control systems.  Reactivity 
feedbacks from cladding and fuel expansion, fuel temperature (Doppler), core structure 
expansion, liquid coolant density changes, coolant boiling, and coolant voiding from fission gas 
release are summed with a user-specified control rod motion reactivity.  SASSYS-1 employs a 
multiple pin per channel modeling concept, in which a single fuel pin and its associated cladding, 
coolant, and structure (wire wrap, grid, and/or wrapper can) are taken as representative of a 
number of fuel elements, and many single-pin models are used to represent the whole core.  
Multiple single-pin heat transfer models may be cooled by a common coolant channel to 
represent intra-subassembly heterogeneity effects, and channel-to-channel heat transfer may be 
specified to simulate subassembly-to-subassembly heat transfer effects.  Transient solutions are 
obtained to track the core, liquid metal coolant loops, and balance-of-plant behavior from the 
initial, steady state through a transient caused by control system trips or an assumed fault.  
SASSYS-1 calculates the whole-plant response, with detailed temperature and flow predictions 
for assessment of compliance with technical specifications in design basis transients. 
 
SASSYS-1 has been used extensively as a design basis analysis tool for the EBR-II and FFTF 
reactors, and as a conceptual design evaluation code in the U.S.D.O.E. reactor development 
projects (e.g. LSPB, SAFR, PRISM).  The models in SASSYS-1 have been validated with 
extensive analyses of reactor and plant test data from EBR-II and FFTF. 
 
B.1.1 Reactor Core Thermal-Hydraulic Model 
 
In SASSYS-1, the thermal/hydraulic performance of the reactor core is represented with a single-
pin model in multiple channels.  In this multiple channel whole-core model, each channel 
represents a single fuel pin and the associated coolant and structure.  The structure field may be 
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used to represent some part of the hex-can and the pin spacers.  One-dimensional, radial heat 
transfer calculations are performed at many axial locations to model heat transfer from the fuel 
through the cladding to the coolant, and from the coolant to the structure, the gas plenum, and the 
reflectors.  One-dimensional (axial) coolant flow is modeled with a momentum equation solution 
for the axial pressure profile, and convective heat transfer conditions are assumed at the 
interfaces between the coolant and the cladding, the reflectors, and the structure.  Temperatures 
are calculated at multiple radial nodes in the fuel, the cladding, the reflectors, and the structure.  
The coolant has a single temperature at each axial location.  Axial heat conduction is neglected.  
Figure 2.3-1 shows the spatial temperature mesh in the SASSYS-1 single-pin model. 
 
For the whole-core model, each of the SASSYS-1 channels represents a single, average pin in a 
subassembly, and several subassemblies are grouped together, so that a single channel may 
represent all the pins in a number of subassemblies.  Pins with similar geometrical dimensions, 
power, flow, enrichment, burn-up, thermo-physical properties, and performance characteristics 
(reactivity feedback, mechanical, thermal, fluid dynamics) are grouped for modeling by a single 
channel.  In this way, all of the pins in the reactor are modeled with a multiple channel model.  
Typical modeling detail ranges from a few to a few dozen channels, depending on the reactor 
design and the transient phenomena being simulated. 
 
B.1.2 Coolant Systems Thermal-Hydraulic Model 
 
The model in SASSYS-1 for thermal-hydraulic representation of primary and intermediate 
sodium systems is called PRIMAR-4.  This model permits representation of coolant flow and 
heat transfer effects outside the reactor by simulation with a network of volumes connected with 
flow paths.  The PRIMAR-4 model computes coolant pressures, flow rates, and temperatures in 
the primary and intermediate heat transport circuits.  Components represented by PRIMAR-4 
include the inlet and outlet plenums, pipes, pumps, heat exchangers, steam generators, and 
reactor vessel air cooling systems.  A typical PRIMAR-4 model for a pool-type primary system 
is depicted in Fig. 2.3-8. 
 
In the PRIMAR-4 model, a number of compressible volumes are connected by liquid or gas 
segments, and each liquid segment may consist of one or more elements.  This treatment allows 
SASSYS-1 to be used for an arbitrary arrangement of components, since compressible volumes 
and segments can be connected in an arbitrary manner.  Given a high degree of modeling 
flexibility, PRIMAR-4 can be used to represent both loop-type and pool-type reactor designs. 
 
The compressible volumes in PRIMAR-4 may be liquid volumes, gas volumes, or partially 
liquid volumes with a cover gas.  If a compressible volume does not contain a cover gas, then the 
liquid is treated as compressible.  Compressible volumes are characterized by pressure, volume, 
mass, and temperature, and they may accumulate gas or liquid by compressing the cover gas or 
liquid.  The pressure in the compressible volume drives the flows through the liquid and gas 
segments.  Table B1 lists the types of compressible volumes treated in PRIMAR-4.  A discussion 
of the volume thermal stratification model used in the ABTR analysis is included in Section B.3. 
 
The PRIMAR-4 gas segments are treated as pipes that connect the gas space of two compressible 
volumes.  The flow through a gas segment is assumed to be isothermal. 
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The liquid segments in PRIMAR-4 are treated with an incompressible flow model and consist of 
one or more liquid flow elements.  Liquid flow elements are characterized by incompressible 
single-phase flow, with the possibility of heat transfer through the segment wall.  Table B2 lists 
the types of liquid flow elements that can be used to make up a liquid segment.  Element type 1 
denotes the collection of all the single-pin channels in the core. 
 
B.1.3 Point Kinetics and Reactivity Feedback Model 
 
In SASSYS-1, a point kinetics model is employed to calculate the reactor fission power response 
to the transient reactivity state.  At any time, the net reactivity is the sum of a number of 
individual reactivity feedbacks that are determined by the transient thermal, hydraulic, 
mechanical, and neutronic state of the reactor.  The feedback reactivities normally considered are 
fuel Doppler, coolant density, fuel and cladding axial expansion, radial core expansion, and 
control rod driveline thermal expansion.   
 
A decay heat model is integrated with the point kinetics model for the fission power to track 
shutdown events in sub-critical conditions.  A discussion of decay heat model enhancements for 
ABTR analysis is included in Section B.2. 
 
The fuel Doppler feedback is calculated from the spatially dependent fuel temperature 
distribution and the input spatial distribution of the fuel Doppler reactivity coefficient.  In each 
single-pin channel, the axial distribution of the radial pin-average fuel temperature is used to 
calculate the reactivity feedback.  SASSYS-1 interpolates between coolant-intact and coolant-
voided Doppler coefficients using the current local coolant void fraction to determine the local 
Doppler coefficient. 
 
The coolant density reactivity feedback is calculated from the spatially dependent coolant density 
distribution and the input distribution of the coolant density reactivity coefficient calculated from 
perturbation theory.  The reactivity feedback data is entered as a coolant void worth (the negative 
of the coolant mass worth), and the coolant density feedback reactivity is calculated from the 
time-dependent axial density distribution in each single-pin channel. 
  
The DEFORM-4 (oxide fuel) and DEFORM-5 (metallic fuel) fuel behavior models are available 
in SASSYS-1 to predict transient fuel and cladding axial dimension changes, and in each single-
pin channel, the reactivity feedback associated with fuel and cladding axial expansion are 
computed from first order perturbation theory. 
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Table B1.  PRIMAR-4 Compressible Volume Types. 
 
Type No. Description 
1 Inlet plenum 
2 Compressible liquid volume, no cover gas 
3 Compressible outlet plenum, no cover gas 
4 Almost incompressible liquid, no cover gas 
5 Pipe rupture source 
6 Pipe rupture sink, guard vessel 
7 Outlet plenum with cover gas 
8 Pool with cover gas 
9 Pump bowl with cover gas 
10 Expansion tank with cover gas 
11 Compressible gas volume, no liquid 
 
 
Table B2. PRIMAR-4 Flow Element Types. 
 
Type No. Description 
1 Core subassemblies (Single pin channels) 
2 Bypass channel 
3 Pipe 
4 Check valve 
5 Pump impeller 
6 IHX, shell side 
7 IHX, tube side 
8 Steam generator, coolant side 
9 DRACS heat exchanger, tube side 
10 DRACS heat exchanger, shell side 
11 Valve 
12 Air dump heat exchanger, coolant side. 
13 Annular element 
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The detailed radial core expansion model in SASSYS-1 accounts for core dilation due to thermal 
expansion of the hexcan load pads, thermal expansion of the core support grid plate, and 
transient bending of the core subassemblies due to radial temperature gradients and constraints 
imposed by radial restraint rings at the load pad elevations.  Reactivity feedback is then 
calculated from the computed core dimension change and an input linear reactivity coefficient 
based on stand-alone neutronics eigenvalue calculations. 
 
For the control rod driveline feedback model, it is assumed that the control rod drivelines are 
washed by the outlet coolant from the core.  Thermal expansion of the drives due to a rise in core 
outlet temperature will cause the control rods to be inserted further into the core, providing a 
negative reactivity component.  On the other hand, if the control rod drives are supported on the 
vessel head, and if the core is supported by the vessel walls, then heating the vessel walls will either 
lower the core or raise the control rod drive supports, leading to a positive reactivity component. 
Both the control drive expansion and the vessel wall expansion are accounted for in SASSYS-1. 
 
B.2 Decay Heat Model Development for ABTR 
 
A more detailed decay heat model has been developed for the SASSYS-1 code to support the 
unique decay heat characteristics that might be present in the advanced, actinide-bearing fuels 
planned for use in the ABTR. The key features of the new model include extending the number 
of exponential terms that can be used to represent decay heat from six to 24, the inclusion of 
built-in decay heat parameters from the most recent ANS decay heat power standard, the ability 
to mix multiple user-supplied and/or built-in decay heat curves within a single region, and the 
inclusion of a pre-defined non-decay-heat region. These features allow greater flexibility than the 
previous model and can more accurately represent decay heat during long term transients. The 
updated decay heat model has been incorporated in the forthcoming Version 4.0 of the SAS code. 
 
In the following sections, the implementation of the new model with support for multiple decay 
heat curves per region is discussed, and an improved method for initializing steady-state decay 
heat prior to a transient calculation is described. First, however, it is useful to describe the ANS 
decay heat standard, along with how it is applied to the SAS decay heat model. 
 
B.2.1 The ANS Decay Heat Power Standard 
 
The American Nuclear Society (ANS) recently published an updated standard [B2] for decay 
heat power in light water reactors.  For over 25 years, an extension to the standard has been 
planned to address fast reactor fuel cycles. In the absence of any such extension, the standard for 
light-water reactors is used to define the built-in decay heat curves for the updated SAS decay 
heat model. In addition, the expressions described below apply to both the standard and user-
defined curves, and are the expressions solved by the updated decay heat model. 
 
In the ANS standard, decay heat power is defined for each of four different fissionable isotopes 
in terms of 23-term exponential functions: 
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where αn is the immediate contribution (in MeV/s) of exponential term n to the decay power 
resulting from one fission event, λn is the decay constant for term n, and t is time in seconds after 
the fission event. The standard currently defines decay heat power for thermal fission in U-235 
and Pu-239, fast fission in U-238, and thermal fission in Pu-241. In principle, any number of 
terms may be used in the exponential expansion. The updated decay heat model supports up to 
24 terms for each curve. 
 
The ANS standard defines a method for calculating the decay heat power, after shutdown, which 
results from a known reactor power history. Although not stated in the standard, the method 
given makes an implicit assumption that the ratio between total power and fission power is fixed 
when calculating the number of fissions for a given power level. This is not precisely correct, 
especially for fresh fuel at the start of irradiation, and will generally underestimate the number of 
fissions and therefore the resulting decay heat power. An examination of the parameters given 
for U-235 suggest that it takes over ten hours of steady-state operation to reach 90% of the 
equilibrium decay power, and roughly 3½ months to reach 98%. At a fixed total power, then, the 
fission power will depend on the current level of the decay heat power. The standard avoids the 
issue by defining decay heat power on a per-fission basis, leaving it up to the user of the standard 
to provide an appropriate value for the recoverable energy per fission. 
 
In light of this discrepancy and in consideration of the fact that the SAS code performs decay 
heat calculations based on fission power (not total power) the methods prescribed in the ANS 
standard are modified so that they can be adapted for use in the SAS code. Furthermore, the 
standard describes “adjustments” that can be made to the calculated decay heat power to account 
for neutron capture in fission products. Because these adjustments are specific to a thermal-
spectrum reactor, they are not accounted for here. In addition, the standard describes a method 
for including contributions from U-239 and Np-239 decay heat power. Because a fast reactor 
generally has a significant quantity of actinides contributing to decay heat power, this adjustment 
is also not accounted for here. Instead, user-supplied decay heat curves can be combined with the 
ANS standard curves to accomplish the same task in a manner that is relevant to the problem 
being solved. Finally, the standard describes methods for determining uncertainty. Because SAS 
is a deterministic code, uncertainty calculations are not performed. 
 
To calculate decay heat power in terms of fission power rather than total power, the total 
recoverable energy per fission in a fissionable isotope, Qt, is separated into “prompt” fission 
energy, Qf, and the energy from complete decay of fission products, Qd: 
 
 dft QQQ +=  (MeV/fission) (B-2) 
 
The energy from decay of fission products can be calculated by integrating Eq (B-1) over all 
time: 
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If the total recoverable energy per fission is known (or input by the user) then the prompt energy 
per fission can be determined as dtf QQQ −= . A useful term, to be used later, is the ratio of the 
decay energy to the prompt energy, 
 
 ∑∑
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Therefore, β is the total decay heat yield per unit fission heat. 
 
Eq (B-1) gives the decay heat power as a function of time after a single fission event. To 
calculate decay heat power, the number of fissions and their time dependence needs to be known. 
The fission rate at time t′ can be written as 
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where P0 is the nominal reactor power (Watts), Pf is the relative fission power normalized to the 
nominal reactor power, and K = 1.602177×10-13 J/MeV. The total number of fission events 
between time t′ and t′ + dt′ is then 
 
 ( ) ( ) td
KQ
tP
PtdtF
f
f ′′=′′ 0  (Fissions) (B-3) 
 
The relative decay power at time t > t′ resulting from the fissions represented by Eq. (B-3) can be 
calculated by combining Eq. (B-3) with Eq. (B-1): 
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where Pd is the relative decay power normalized to the nominal reactor power, P0. The total 
decay power at time t from all fissions prior to time t can be determined by integrating the above 
equation: 
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Note that Eq (B-4) is similar in form to Equation (3) given in the ANS standard, with the 
exception that the ratio of total power to total recoverable energy, Pt/Qt, is used in the ANS 
standard. The equation in the standard underestimates the fission rate in fresh fuel shortly after 
startup. While this is likely to be a very small error in most calculations, SAS evaluates decay 
heat in terms of the fission power and the correct form of Eq (B-4) is more convenient. 
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B.2.2 Implementation of the Updated Decay Heat Model 
 
In previous versions of SAS, a channel is assigned to a single decay heat curve. Since multiple 
decay heat curves may now be assigned to a single channel, each channel is now assigned to a 
decay heat region, where a region is defined by the properties of multiple decay heat curves. 
With this, multiple curves can be assigned (with different weights) to a single region, and a 
single curve can be used within multiple regions. Previous input decks are still supported. In this 
case, each region is defined by a single curve, and curves and regions have the same meaning. 
 
B.2.2.1 Contributions from Multiple Isotopes 
 
In the preceding discussion, a single fissionable isotope is assumed, as seen in Eq. (B-4). The 
determination of decay heat power contributions from multiple fissionable isotopes is 
straightforward. If xi represents the fraction of the total fission power from isotope I, then the 
normalized fission power from isotope I is written as 
 
 fifi PxP = , 
 
and the decay power from isotope I is 
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Here, fi(t) represents the decay heat parameters for isotope i. 
 
In practice the decay heat power from isotope I is calculated using the normalized fission power 
only, as shown in Eq (B-4), such that 
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The fractional fission powers are only applied when total (or integrated) decay heat power is 
calculated. Therefore, total decay heat power is defined as 
 
 ( ) ( )∑ ′=
i
diid tPxtP   (B-5) 
 
In the following sections, equations are derived for a single isotope, while the summation given 
by Eq (B-5) is implied when total decay heat power is calculated. 
 
B.2.2.2 Transient Calculations 
 
At the beginning of a transient calculation, the initial decay heat power and fission power are 
known as a result of the steady-state initialization (see below). From that point on, fission power 
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is determined based on the point (or spatial) kinetics equations. Given the normalized fission 
power, the normalized decay power can be solved using Eq. (B-4). To simplify notation, only a 
single term from Eq (B-1) is considered, and a term for decay heat (i.e. energy) is introduced, 
where the decay heat, Hn, is defined by Pd(t) = ΣλnHn(t). At time step k, the time varies from tk to 
tk + τ. Term n of Eq. (B-4) (in terms of decay heat) can then be written as 
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Note that the first integral is just the (known) decay heat at the beginning of the time step, Hn(tk). 
To write the second integral in terms of the time within a time step, let t = t′ − tk. Then the above 
equation can be written as 
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From the point kinetics solution used in SAS, the fission power over time step k is represented by 
a second-order polynomial: 
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where P0 = Pf(tk). Using this expansion, the decay heat at the end of the point-kinetics time step 
can be solved: 
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B.2.2.3 Steady-State Initialization 
 
Prior to commencing with the transient calculations, SAS performs a steady-state initialization 
that includes the determination of initial decay heat. The code provides the option of entering a 
reactor power history as a histogram of relative reactor power. Assuming no initial decay heat is 
present at the beginning of the power history (i.e. fresh fuel with no fission products) the initial 
fission power will be equal to the power level of the first histogram. However, as decay heat 
builds, fission power will decrease to maintain constant power. 
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Like the decay heat calculations during a transient, the decay heat during the constant-power 
interval, k, can be written as 
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However, only the total power is known in this case, not the fission power. The above equation 
can be rewritten as 
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For a single fissionable isotope, this represents a coupled set of N ≤ 24 integral equations. 
(Related equations could be written in differential form). When multiple fissionable isotopes 
contribute to a single decay heat region in the SAS calculation, a second summation is 
introduced (i.e. by Eq (B-5)) and the number of coupled equations can increase dramatically. 
 
To decouple the terms in Eq. (B-8), two assumptions are made. First, the fraction of fission 
power contributed by each fissionable isotope is assumed to be fixed by the values of xi. Second, 
the fission power is assumed to be a constant such that the total power at the end of the constant-
power interval matches the value supplied by the user. The first assumption only applies to decay 
heat regions that use more than one decay heat curve and may not be valid where there is 
significant depletion or breeding of fissionable isotopes during the course of steady-state 
initialization. 
 
The second assumption was chosen for a number of reasons. First, by matching power at the end 
of the initiating power interval, it maintains continuity between the steady-state initialization and 
the transient calculation. Second, it can be shown (by example) to introduce at most only a few 
hundredths of a percent error in most cases, and up to a few tenths of a percent error in very 
unusual situations. Third, it correctly predicts the two bounding cases of fresh fuel (no decay 
heat) and infinitely-long, steady-state equilibrium. 
 
By assuming a constant (although initially unknown) fission power, the integral in Eq. (B-8) can 
be solved: 
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Note that this is the same as Eq. (B-6) with P0 = Pf and P1 and P2 set to zero. By multiplying by 
λn and summing the above equation over all decay terms, the decay power at the end of the time 
step is 
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As previously stated, the additional sum over isotopes with the appropriate xi, as shown in 
Eq. (B-5), is implied. 
 
Given the user-supplied total power and that Pt = Pf + Pd, the fission power can now be solved: 
 
 
( )
( )∑
∑
−
−
−+
−
=
n
n
n
knnt
f n
n
e
etHP
P τλ
τλ
β
λ
11
  (B-10) 
 
Again, the sum over isotopes is implied. If the preexisting decay power at the end of the time 
step (the second term in the numerator) is greater than the user-supplied total power, then the 
fission power for that histogram is set to zero by the code. This will be the case, for example, if 
the user specifies a zero-power shutdown period. Otherwise, the numerator represents the fission 
power if no new decay power is generated during the time step. The denominator then adjusts 
that value so that the fission power plus accumulated decay power will be equal to the total 
power at the end of the time step. 
 
Finally, by substituting Eq. (B-10) into Eq. (B-9), the decay heat can be determined at the end of 
this step in the histogram. For an infinitely-long power interval, Eq. (B-10) simplifies to 
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tf PP , 
 
and the decay heat from Eq. (B-9) is 
 
 ( )
n
n
fkn PtH λ
βτ =+ . 
 
These two expressions match the analytical solution exactly. 
 
B.2.3 Verification of the Updated Decay Heat Model 
 
The updated decay heat model has undergone extensive verification by comparing computed 
results with the published ANS decay heat standard [B2] as well as with results calculated by 
independent means. Results of this comparison are described below and verify that the new 
decay heat model incorporated into the SASSYS-1 code accurately computes decay heat power. 
 
B.2.3.1 Comparisons with the ANS Decay Heat Power Standard 
 
The ANS standard includes tables of decay heat power as a function of time after shutdown 
following a steady-state irradiation of 1013 seconds. While the comparison with the published 
standard is straightforward, it is complicated somewhat by the fact that 1) unlike the assumptions 
in the standard, fission power does not immediately drop to zero after shutdown in a SAS 
transient calculation due to the presence of delayed neutrons, 2) the adaptive time-step control 
used by SAS during a transient calculation make difficult the direct comparison with tabulated 
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values, and 3) tabulated values in the ANS standard extend from 1 second to 1010 seconds, which 
is a range that is difficult to reproduce in a SAS calculation. 
 
Two different approaches were used to resolve these difficulties. In the first, a SAS input deck 
was constructed that represent a “generic” four-channel problem. Within this input deck, the 
maximum time step size is limited to 0.1 seconds, and a single delayed-neutron precursor group 
was assumed with a very large decay constant so that fission power would drop rapidly after 
shutdown, which is triggered by a -10$ reactivity insertion at time zero. Each of the four 
channels is assigned to a separate decay heat region representing one of the four isotopes 
characterized in the standard, and decay heat is initialized with a 1013 second steady-state 
irradiation. With the given the point kinetics input, fission power drops essentially to zero within 
the first time step after shutdown. However, the initial rapid power change causes SAS to 
temporarily reduce subsequent time-step sizes so that later edits do not exactly match the times 
in the published tables, although many of them are within a few tenths of a second. The transient 
calculation is run to 1000 seconds after shutdown. 
 
The second approach taken eliminates all the difficulties described above, but does so by using a 
modified version of the SAS code that skips the normal transient calculation. After the normal 
input processing and steady-state initialization (using the same input deck as in the previous 
approach), a loop is entered that calls the decay heat calculation routines with zero fission power 
and a prescribed set of time steps. Therefore, the times and fission power history of the tabulated 
values in the ANS standard can be followed exactly, and direct comparison can be made out to 
1010 seconds. Comparisons of both approaches with the tabulated ANS standard results indicate 
that the updated SAS decay heat model accurately reproduces the values of the ANS standard. 
To illustrate, results for Pu-239 are shown in Table B3. Because decay heat power in the ANS 
standard is reported in terms of MeV/fission, a total recoverable energy per fission, Qt, of 200 
MeV/fission is assumed for converting the values reported in the standard to units of normalized 
decay power, which are the units reported by SAS. This value of Qt is consistent with the default 
used in the updated decay heat model. 
 
Table B3 is divided into two components: “a” and “b”. Table B3(a) illustrates the results for 
Pu-239 from the first approach described above. As seen in this table, the time steps do not 
match with the tabulated ANS standard values. Nevertheless, separately-computed values based 
on the ANS standard are presented for comparison with the SAS results. Also, for 10, 100, and 
1000 seconds, tabulated results from the standard are presented for comparison. Table B3(b) 
represents results for Pu-239 from the second approach described above, and provides a direct 
comparison with the ANS standard out to 1010 seconds.  
 
In Table B3(a) there is excellent agreement prior to the onset of the SAS transient calculation (i.e. 
at time zero). Because the point kinetics solution starts the transient with a non-zero fission 
power, there is a brief, but finite period of time where the fission power is non-zero during the 
shutdown transient despite the large decay constant for the delayed neutron precursors. This 
results in a slight over-prediction in the decay power relative to the published ANS standard, 
which assumes immediate shutdown with zero fission power. Nevertheless, by 1000 seconds, the 
perturbation has mostly died away, and the differences in the results are consistent with 
Table B3(b) 
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Table B3(a): Comparison of Normalized Pu-239 Decay Heat 
Power after Shutdown Following an Irradiation of 1013 Seconds. 
 
Time (s) 
ANS 
Standard 
SAS 
Model 
Difference 
(%) 
0.000 5.467E-02 5.468E-02 0.0031 
9.763 4.138E-02 4.139E-02 0.0170 
10.000 4.125E-02 -- -- 
19.763 3.748E-02 3.748E-02 0.0107 
39.763 3.360E-02 3.360E-02 0.0073 
99.763 2.847E-02 2.847E-02 0.0049 
100.000 2.845E-02 -- -- 
199.763 2.494E-02 2.495E-02 0.0042 
399.763 2.182E-02 2.182E-02 0.0036 
999.763 1.761E-02 1.761E-02 0.0036 
1000.000 1.761E-02 -- -- 
 
Table B3(b): Extended Comparison of Normalized Pu-239 Decay Heat Power after Shutdown Following 
an Irradiation of 1013 Seconds. 
 
Time (s) 
ANS 
Standard 
SAS 
Model 
Difference 
(%) Time (s) 
ANS 
Standard 
SAS 
Model 
Difference 
(%) 
Shutdown 5.467E-02 5.468E-02 0.0031 1.0E+05 4.741E-03 4.741E-03 0.0032 
1.0E+00 5.137E-02 5.138E-02 0.0030 1.5E+05 4.270E-03 4.270E-03 0.0031 
1.5E+00 5.015E-02 5.016E-02 0.0031 2.0E+05 3.975E-03 3.975E-03 0.0030 
2.0E+00 4.911E-02 4.911E-02 0.0031 4.0E+05 3.348E-03 3.348E-03 0.0031 
4.0E+00 4.606E-02 4.606E-02 0.0031 6.0E+05 3.002E-03 3.002E-03 0.0032 
6.0E+00 4.401E-02 4.401E-02 0.0030 8.0E+05 2.762E-03 2.762E-03 0.0031 
8.0E+00 4.247E-02 4.247E-02 0.0031 1.0E+06 2.579E-03 2.579E-03 0.0029 
1.0E+01 4.125E-02 4.125E-02 0.0030 1.5E+06 2.262E-03 2.263E-03 0.0030 
1.5E+01 3.901E-02 3.901E-02 0.0031 2.0E+06 2.054E-03 2.054E-03 0.0030 
2.0E+01 3.741E-02 3.742E-02 0.0031 4.0E+06 1.612E-03 1.612E-03 0.0029 
4.0E+01 3.356E-02 3.357E-02 0.0031 6.0E+06 1.401E-03 1.401E-03 0.0028 
6.0E+01 3.129E-02 3.129E-02 0.0030 8.0E+06 1.269E-03 1.269E-03 0.0030 
8.0E+01 2.968E-02 2.968E-02 0.0030 1.0E+07 1.171E-03 1.171E-03 0.0032 
1.0E+02 2.845E-02 2.845E-02 0.0032 1.5E+07 1.003E-03 1.003E-03 0.0035 
1.5E+02 2.634E-02 2.634E-02 0.0031 2.0E+07 8.944E-04 8.944E-04 0.0031 
2.0E+02 2.494E-02 2.494E-02 0.0030 4.0E+07 6.813E-04 6.813E-04 0.0031 
4.0E+02 2.182E-02 2.182E-02 0.0032 6.0E+07 5.798E-04 5.798E-04 0.0030 
6.0E+02 1.999E-02 1.999E-02 0.0032 8.0E+07 5.175E-04 5.175E-04 0.0031 
8.0E+02 1.866E-02 1.866E-02 0.0032 1.0E+08 4.771E-04 4.771E-04 0.0031 
1.0E+03 1.761E-02 1.761E-02 0.0032 1.5E+08 4.235E-04 4.235E-04 0.0030 
1.5E+03 1.567E-02 1.567E-02 0.0028 2.0E+08 3.978E-04 3.978E-04 0.0031 
2.0E+03 1.432E-02 1.432E-02 0.0033 4.0E+08 3.444E-04 3.444E-04 0.0031 
4.0E+03 1.141E-02 1.141E-02 0.0034 6.0E+08 3.043E-04 3.043E-04 0.0029 
6.0E+03 1.004E-02 1.004E-02 0.0026 8.0E+08 2.699E-04 2.699E-04 0.0030 
8.0E+03 9.225E-03 9.225E-03 0.0031 1.0E+09 2.402E-04 2.402E-04 0.0029 
1.0E+04 8.663E-03 8.664E-03 0.0031 1.5E+09 1.826E-04 1.826E-04 0.0032 
1.5E+04 7.769E-03 7.769E-03 0.0031 2.0E+09 1.426E-04 1.426E-04 0.0032 
2.0E+04 7.215E-03 7.215E-03 0.0030 4.0E+09 7.336E-05 7.336E-05 0.0031 
4.0E+04 6.053E-03 6.053E-03 0.0031 6.0E+09 5.737E-05 5.737E-05 0.0030 
6.0E+04 5.435E-03 5.435E-03 0.0030 8.0E+09 5.364E-05 5.364E-05 0.0030 
8.0E+04 5.030E-03 5.031E-03 0.0030 1.0E+10 5.275E-05 5.275E-05 0.0031 
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In Table B3(b), the extended decay heat calculation is shown out to 1010 seconds. At all points in 
time, there is near perfect agreement, with a maximum difference of a few thousandths of a 
percent. As will be shown in the next section, the apparent bias in the SAS model results is 
actually due to an assumption made in the ANS standard. 
 
B.2.3.2 Comparison with Numerical Integration 
 
In the comparisons with the ANS standard presented above, the SAS model calculates decay heat 
power results that are slightly higher than the standard. As described earlier, the methods 
described in the ANS standard make an implicit assumption that the ratio between total power 
and fission power is fixed, which will generally underestimate the number of fissions and 
therefore the fission-product decay heat power. Even after an irradiation of 1013 seconds, decay 
heat power is not at true equilibrium because some of the terms in the exponential expansions 
documented in the ANS standard have half-lives greater than 1013 seconds. For shorter 
irradiation times, the effects of the assumption will be more important. 
 
To assess the impact of this assumption, a separate algorithm was written to numerically 
integrate the terms of the U-235 decay heat parameters defined in the standard out to 1013 
seconds using a relatively small time step size of 1000 seconds in the integration. During the 
integration, total power is held constant by adjusting the fission power to account for time-
dependent increases in decay heat power. Therefore, the coupled decay heat equations are solved 
accurately. 
 
Results of the numerical integration are shown in Table B4 along with corresponding results 
from the ANS standard and the SAS decay heat model. As shown in the table, the ANS standard 
underpredicts the decay heat power. This indicates that the bias seen in the previous tables is due 
to the implicit assumption made in the ANS standard and not due to the SAS decay heat model. 
Finally, the differences between the numerical integration and the SAS decay heat model are 
insignificant as they are within the precision of the printed output used to generate the results. 
 
 
Table B4: Comparison of Normalized U-235 Decay Heat Power from Numerical Integration with the 
ANS Standard and SAS Model Following an Irradiation of 1013 Seconds. 
 
ANS Standard SAS Model 
Time (s) 
Numerical 
Integration Decay Heat Difference (%) Decay Heat Difference (%) 
Shutdown 6.72447E-02 6.72421E-02 -0.0038 6.72447E-02 0.0001 
1000 1.89975E-02 1.89968E-02 -0.0038 1.89975E-02 -0.0001 
10000 9.56024E-03 9.55987E-03 -0.0038 9.56024E-03 0.0000 
100000 4.86452E-03 4.86433E-03 -0.0038 4.86452E-03 0.0000 
1000000 2.77338E-03 2.77328E-03 -0.0038 2.77338E-03 -0.0001 
 
 
B.2.3.3 Other Comparisons 
 
The above comparisons demonstrate that the updated SAS decay heat model accurately predicts 
fission product decay heat when compared to the ANS standard and when compared with 
separate numerical integrations. These comparisons were based on results for individual isotopes 
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using the built-in decay heat parameters included in the model. The updated SAS decay heat 
model also supports user-supplied decay heat curves as well as combining multiple curves within 
a single decay heat region. 
 
To verify these two capabilities, the parameters for the ANS standard curves were entered in the 
SAS input deck as user-supplied values and the tests were repeated. The resulting calculations 
matched exactly with the results using the built-in curves. Next, the user-supplied curves were 
combined with the built-in standard curves such that each decay heat region still represented a 
single isotope (and could therefore be compared with the standard), but the contribution for each 
region was the result of the combination of a user-supplied curve and a built-in curve. Again, the 
results matched exactly with the results using the built-in curves alone. These tests verify that the 
processing of user-supplied input data and the combination of multiple decay heat curves within 
a single decay heat region are properly treated by the updated decay heat model. 
 
B.3 Stratified Volume Model Development for ABTR 
 
In addition to the uniformly mixed compressible volume model, PRIMAR-4 contains a stratified 
temperature model for the liquid in a compressible volume.  This stratified model can be used for 
an outlet plenum and/or for a pool.  This model borrows from the PLENUM-2A model [B3] of 
Howard and Lorenz, but the PRIMAR-4 model has been extended beyond the capabilities of the 
PLENUM-2A model.  Borrowed from PLENUM-2A is the concept of a small number of distinct 
temperature regions in the coolant, separated by horizontal interfaces.  Also borrowed are the 
concepts of distinct stages in the calculation, a plenum height correlation, and a correlation for 
interface rise due to entrainment of a hot layer into a cooler plume rising from the core outlet.  
One extension of the PRIMAR-4 model is the provision for handling up transients as well as 
down transients:  PLENUM-2A will only handle transients in which the core outlet temperature 
is cooler than the plenum temperature, whereas the PRIMAR-4 model will also handle transients 
in which the core outlet temperature is hotter than the plenum temperature.  Another extension is 
the option in the PRIMAR-4 model to handle a horizontal discharge from an IHX into a cold 
pool:  PLENUM-2A will only handle a vertical discharge from the core into an outlet plenum.  
The PRIMAR-4 model handles up to three regions and five stages, whereas PLENUM-2A 
considers only two regions and three stages.  Also, the PRIMAR-4 model treats thermal 
conduction across the interface between regions, and this model includes detailed multi-node 
wall temperature calculations. 
 
Figure B1 shows the various stages and cases considered in this stratified model.  At the start of 
a transient in which the core outlet temperature is dropping, the plume in the outlet plenum goes 
to the top of the plenum; and the outlet plenum is fully mixed, giving stage 1.  As the core outlet 
temperature and velocity drop, the plume no longer reaches the top of the plenum.  This leads to 
the start of stage 2 in which the outlet coolant goes to layer 1.  In stage 2 the layer boundary is at 
the elevation of the core outlet.  After enough cool liquid has entered layer 1 to fill one quarter of 
its volume, stage 3, case 3.1 begins.  In this case, the plume coolant still goes to layer 1, but the 
interface between layers rises as liquid is added to layer 1.  In this case, the plume also entrains 
hot liquid from the interface into layer 1.  If the core outlet temperature at the start of the 
transient becomes hotter than the outlet plenum temperature, then stage 3, case 3.2 is entered.  In 
this case, the core outlet coolant goes to the top hot layer, entraining cool outlet  
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Figure B1.  Stratified Volume Stages. 
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Figure B1.  Stratified Volume Stages. (cont.) 
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plenum liquid as it passes through.  The three layer cases of stages 4 and 5 can occur in the later 
stages of a transient if the core outlet temperature starts out rising and later falls, or if the core 
outlet temperature starts out falling and later rises.  If the coolant inlet into the volume is 
horizontal, as in the discharge of an IHX into a cold pool, then only stages 1, 3, and 5 are used. 
 
The jet height or plume height is calculated from an equation given by Yang [B4]: 
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For entrainment at an interface, Howard and Lorenz give: 
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The values of  and  depend on elevation and on whether the interface occurs within the zone 
of flow establishment or in the zone of established flow.  The elevation change, , from the 
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jv jd
oz
 
 
0.111
r
z oo = . 
 
 64
For , or the zone of flow establishment: ozz <
 
 2
o
2
oo
o
j
d
z0.10522
1
d
z0.003969d
z0.020950.25
v
v
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
=  
 
and 
 
 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+=
oo
j
d
z0.21041
d
d
. 
 
For , or the zone of established flow: ozz >
 
 
o
o
j
d
z
2.018
v
v =  
 
and 
 
 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
oo
j
d
z0.8649
d
d
. 
 
For the wall temperatures, multi-node treatments are used.  The vertical wall around the outside 
of the outlet plenum or pool is treated with a number of vertical nodes.  Each vertical node 
contains a number of lateral nodes, with coolant in contact with the first node.  There is also an 
option to have another coolant compressible volume in contact with the last lateral node to 
account for heat transfer from a hot outlet plenum to a cold pool.  The model has an option for a 
horizontal wall at the top or bottom of the plenum.  This wall is handled with a 1-D multimode 
treatment.  Again, the first node is in contact with the plenum liquid, and the last node can be in 
contact with the coolant in another compressible volume. 
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